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NOTE
ON THE BASIS OF SEX(UAL ORIENTATION OR
GENDER IDENTITY): BRINGING QUEER EQUITY
TO SCHOOL WITH TITLE IX
Chan Tov McNanaraht
A transgender fourth-grader's teacher refuses to address
her by her preferred name and gender. A lesbian high-school
student's sexual education class does not teach her about
topics relevant to her experience as a queer woman. A gay
male college student's campus does not have LGBT-specific
post-sexual assault care. Under aformal equality approach to
Title IX, can any of these discriminations be remedied? Unfor-
tunately not.
And yet, recent victories for the LGBT community have
been won on formal equality arguments-that LGBT persons
should be treated the same as heterosexual, cisgender per-
sons. In the shadow of marriage equality, the LGBT commu-
nity has pivoted towards fighting other aspects of
discrimination, most recently in the educational setting.
There, they have continued to apply formal equality legal
strategies. However, as this Note contends, the use of Title IX
as a tool of formal equality is antithetic to the substantive
equality theoretical underpinnings of the statute. In response,
this Note imagines an approach that honors the substantive
equality mandate at the heart of Title IX.
The results are transformative; once one appreciates the
proposition that simply guaranteeing queer students access to
existing services is insufficient to ensure that LGBT students
actually receive equal access to the benefits of educational
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opportunities, Title IX becomes a comprehensive tool for ad-
vancing queer student equity. Ultimately, this Note concludes
by illustrating how Title IX can provide substantive equality
for queer students at every level of the educational system.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2014, during his freshman year of high school,
fourteen-year-old Gavin Grimm came out to his family as
transgender. 2 Shortly thereafter, Gavin began seeing a psy-
chologist and was formally diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria.3
In July, in order to begin living in accordance with his male
gender identity, Gavin legally changed his name.4
Before the start of his sophomore year, Gavin and his
mother informed Gloucester High School officials of his gender
identity and legal name change, and discussed social transition
strategies. 5 At first, Gavin agreed to use a separate single-stall
bathroom in the nurse's office and did not use the boys' locker
room.6 After finding that arrangement stigmatizing, however,
Gavin was given permission to use the male restroom.7 This
caused concern within the wider Gloucester community, and
1 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
2 G.G. ex reL Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739
(E.D. Va. 2015).
3 Gender Dysphoria is "a medical condition characterized by clinically signif-
icant distress caused by an incongruence between a person's gender identity and
the person's birth-assigned sex." G.G. ex reL Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,
822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016).
4 Id.
5 G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 739-40.
6 Id. at 740.
7 Id.
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community members began contacting the School Board in an
effort to bar Gavin from accessing the boys' restroom.8
After using the boys' restroom for over seven weeks, Gavin
became aware of a School Board meeting organized, in part, by
parents and community members determined to "keep that girl
out of the boy's room."9 The meeting would become the first of
two community discussions related to whether Gavin should
be allowed to use the bathroom that corresponded with his
gender identity. o Ultimately, on December 9, 2014, the School
Board folded to public pressure and voted 6-1 against Gavin's
access to male restrooms.1 1
Afterwards, the school principal informed Gavin that he
would be disciplined if he continued to use the boys' restroom
and restricted Gavin to using one of the school's private or
single-stall facilities. 1 2 In response, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union initiated a Title IX claim against the Gloucester
County School Board, alleging that the school's policy prevent-
ing Gavin from using the boys' bathroom discriminated on the
basis of sex, and forcing Gavin to use separate restrooms stig-
matized and isolated him.1 3 The case was ultimately removed
up to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in October 2016.14
The responses were legion. One side of the conversation
contended that Gavin was "not a boy, and the Supreme Court
can never change that." 5 On the other, LGBT activists claimed
the case was about equal treatment-"a boy asking his school
8 G.G., 822 F.3d at 715.
9 Gavin Grimm, Opinion, Gavin Grimnt The Fight for Transgender Rights Is
Bigger than Me, N.Y. TImES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/
07/opinion/gavin-grimm-the-fight-for-transgender-rights-is-bigger-than-
me.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/QE45-987B].
10 At both School Board meetings, community members were extremely
transphobic-referring to Gavin as a "girl." "young lady," "freak," and comparing
him to an animal. See G.G., 822 F.3d at 716.
11 Id.
12 G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 741.
13 Id.
14 See Emma Green, The Trump Administration May Have Doomed Gavin
Grimm's Case, ATIANTIC (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/03/the-trump-administration-may-have-doomed-gavin-grimm/
518676/ [https://perma.cc/BAL6-RC92].
15 Daniel Payne, Gavin GrimnIs Not a Boy, and the Supreme Court Can Never
Change That, FEDERALIST (Nov. 4, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/11/04/
gavin-grimm-not-boy-supreme-court-can-never-change/ [https://perma.cc/
HGV9-SKSH].
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to treat him just like any other boy," 16 while insisting Gavin
"Just wanted to use the bathroom."1 7 In the fall of 2016, LGBT-
rights activists and supporters nationwide waited in anticipa-
tion to see if the Court would affirm transpersons' "basic
rights."18 They would be disappointed.
On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court announced that it
would not decide Gavin's case because the Trump Administra-
tion had reversed the government's position on transgender
student protections.19 Instead, the Court remanded the case to
the Fourth Circuit to be reconsidered in light of the guidance
rescission.20
Like many recent LGBT-rights cases, 2 1 the Gavin Grimm
case-framed around transpersons' equal access to
restrooms-is a model of formal equality.2 2 In adopting this
approach, LGBT rights activists have both mimicked and ex-
plicitly invoked tactics used by the 1960s Civil Rights Move-
16 Dan Rodricks, Judge Sees a Boy, Not a Disorder, BALT. SuN (Apr. 18, 2017,
7:28 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-blog/
bs-md-rodricks-0419-20170418-story.html [https://perma.ce/TR99-AVTV].
17 Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm Just Wanted to Use the Bathroom. He Didn't
Think the Nation Would Debate It, WASH. PosT (Aug. 30, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gavin-grimm-just-wanted-to-use-
the-bathroom-he-didnt-think-the-nation-would-debate-it/2016/08/30/
23fc9892-6a26-1 1e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa-story.htmil?utmterm=.e2f4deO43299h
[https://perma.cc/QIJ4-FM3Q].
18 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won't Hear Major Case on Transgender
Rights, N.Y. Times (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/
politics/supreme-court-transgender-rights-case.html (https://perma.cc/QTX8-
2GT7] (quoting Sarah warbelow, Legal Director of the Human Rights Campaign).
19 See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. exreL Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017);
Liptak, supra note 18.
20 See sources cited supra note 19.
21 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018) (framed as "equal treatment" of same-sex couples); Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (framed as "equal marriage" for same-sex
couples); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (framed as "equal right" to
engage in private, consensual sexual conduct); see also Russell K. Robinson,
Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCIA L. REv. 1010, 1063 (2014) (confirm-
ing the marriage equality movement's endorsement of formal equality).
22 Formal equality involves the idea that on its face law should treat all
persons equally, regardless of protected identity (e.g., race, gender, sexual orien-
tation). That is, processes should treat all persons equally. The theory, however,
does very little to address underlying subjugation based on protected identity and
thus does not ensure equality of substantive outcomes. See infra Part I.
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ment23 and the 1970s Women's Rights Movement. 24 Because
of the LGBT community's vulnerability, 25 urgent need for legal
protections, 26 and recent successful uses of such ap-
proaches, 2 7 framing LGBT rights cases in formal equality terms
may seem like a valuable legal strategy.2 8 Nevertheless, by
echoing the call for formal equality originated by Civil Rights
Movement lawyers, while simultaneously disregarding possible
23 In a recent article, Professor Russell K. Robinson collected a range of
illustrations:
In 2004, after San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom authorized city
officials to marry same-sex couples, a Chicago Tribune writer com-
pared Newsom to Dr. Martin Luther King and iconic civil rights
activist Rosa Parks. Eight years later, marriage equality advocates
in North Carolina ran a black-and-white advertisement that fea-
tured the image of two water fountains, one marked "Straight" and
the other "Gay," with the tag line: "On May 8, make history. Don't
repeat it." . . . During the same month, SF Weekly, a San Francisco
alternative newspaper, ran a cover story on sexual orientation-
based bullying entitled "The Gay Selma."
Robinson, supra note 21, at 1012 (footnotes omitted); see also Craig J. Konnoth,
Note, Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in
the 1950s-1 970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316, 340-52 (2009) (tracking the appropriation of
Black civil rights strategies by the early gay rights movement).
24 See generally Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the
Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 209,
248-49 (1998) (describing the use of formal equality strategies in the 1970s sec-
ond wave of Feminism).
25 See, e.g., Haeyoun Park & laryna Mykhyalyshyn, L.G.B.T. People Are More
Likely to Be Targets of Hate Crimes than Any Other Minority Group, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/hate-
crimes-against-lgbt.html [https://perma.cc/MV8C-7U27] (reporting that LGBT
persons are the most targeted minority group for hate crimes).
26 LGBT individuals are largely unprotected from the discriminatory whims of
both private and governmental actors. Public debates centering around LGBT
persons' basic rights-transpersons' right to use the bathroom of their gender
identity, and whether businesses may discriminate against gay people exercising
their constitutional right to marry-are a testament. See generally Catherine
Jean Archibald, Transgender Bathroom Rights, 24 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 1,
3-6 (2016) (summarizing legal developments and debates over transgender bath-
room and locker-room rights): Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Contemplating
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REv. ONuNE 86, 93-96, 99-100 (2017)
(summarizing the debates surrounding Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm'n, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), rev'd, 137 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)).
27 See Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and
Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 867, 869 (2000)
("[M]any, if not most, of the practical successes for sexual others have emanated
from the formal equality model . . . .").
28 Indeed, others have documented that framing LGBT rights as "equal
rights" is seen as a useful counter to the so-called "special rights frame"-one that
"challenges quests for equal rights, like LGBT-inclusive antidiscrimination policy,
by asserting that such rights are unnecessary claims for special treatment." Erin
M. Adam & Betsy L. Cooper, Equal Rights vs. Special Rights: Rights Discourses,
Framing, and Lesbian and Gay Antidiscrimination Policy in Washington State, 42
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 830, 831 (2017).
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long-term effects, LGBT rights activists damn themselves to
repeat many of the mistakes previous American civil-rights
movements have made. 29
In the Gavin Grimm case and the larger Title IX sphere,
formal equality arguments are shortsighted,3 0 ignore the stat-
ute's legislative history,3 1 and frustrate the purpose of the stat-
ute.3 2 Indeed, the use of Title IX as a tool of formal equality is
antithetic to the substantive equality mandate at the heart of
the statute, and falls short of giving Title IX "a sweep as broad
as its language."3 3 Most importantly, simply guaranteeing
queer students equal access to existing educational services-
the requirement of formal equality-is insufficient to ensure
29 In particular, "father" of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and former NAACP
Legal Defense Fund litigator, the late Derrick Bell spoke extensively on the failings
of using formal equality strategies in the school desegregation cases. See, e.g.,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (1976). Generally, Critical
Race Theorists have been avid proponents of the theory that the use of formal
equality arguments has produced few improvements in the well-being and liveli-
hoods of African Americans. See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes:
Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993,
1056 (1989) ("[Oince Jim Crow was defeated and formal equality was achieved, the
ideology of equal opportunity became a strait jacket on racial progress. It legiti-
mated, rather than challenged, racial injustice."); Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race
Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACK-
LETTER L.J. 1, 81 (2002) (discussing the development of CRT, in part as a reaction
to the failings of formal equality strategies used during the Civil Rights Move-
ment). More recently, Professor Russell K. Robinson made the argument that
Equal Protection jurisprudence-rooted in formal equality-has even reversed
civil rights retrenchments. Robinson, supra note 21, at 1062 ("From contexts
such as schooling to government contracting to voting rights, the Court has
invoked strict scrutiny in order to scrutinize closely and often invalidate race-
based policies meant to address racial subordination."). The Feminist legal move-
ment has similarly come to the realization that formal equality strategies no
longer serve women's best interests. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 24, at 272
("Today, however, we live in a different world. In this world, formal equality is a
barrier to the flexibility and experimentation needed to combat the new, sex
neutral ways in which law supports patriarchy."). In the LGBT context, several
scholars have begun to warn against the use of formal equality arguments. See,
e.g., Libby Adler, Gay Rights and Lefts: Rights Critique and Distributive Analysis
for Real Law Reformi, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (AMICUS ONLINE SUPPLEMENT) 1, 5-7
(2011) [hereinafter Adler, Gay Rights and Lefts] (critiquing LGBT use of formal
equality strategies); Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147,
192-97 (2009) [hereinafter Adler, The Gay Agenda] (same); Dean Spade, Docu-
menting Gender, 59 HASNG L.J. 731, 748-49 (2008) (questioning formal equal-
ity's usefulness for protections for transgender persons).
30 See sources cited supra note 29.
31 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part I.
33 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
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that LGBT students actually receive equal access to the bene-
fits of educational opportunities.3
That concern is the focus of this Note. Previous scholar-
ship framing solutions to anti-queer discrimination in terms of
formal equality3 5 has largely ignored the advances Title IX
could mean for queer student equity.3 6 In response, this Note
offers illustrations of how Title IX can provide substantive
equality-that is, equality of outcomes-for queer students at
every level of the educational system.
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the de-
bates surrounding the model of equality guaranteed by Title IX.
It provides evidence that the mandate at the heart of Title IX is
one of substantive equality, not formal equality.
Part II then examines approaches courts have taken to
extend Title IX protections to cover instances of discrimination
against Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) students, as well as
Transgender students. It will establish that Title IX can and
does cover discrimination faced by such students. Of course,
34 See infra subpart III.D (using vignettes to illustrate this point); see also
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity,
and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1358, 1369 (2000) ("[Glay and
lesbian political activism focuses much of its resources on securing formal equal-
ity rather than on pursuing substantive equality .... [Ejxtreme poverty, subtle
and systemic discrimination, and other current effects of historical subordination
limit the benefits that a formal equality framework can deliver to oppressed clas-
ses."); cf Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case
for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
1049, 1075 (1996) (making the point that formal equality strategies fail to protect
religious minorities).
35 See, e.g., Erin Buzuvis, "On the Basis of Sex": Using Title 1X to Protect
Transgender Students from Discrimination in Education, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER &
Soc'Y 219, 237-40 (2013) (examining only Title lXs possible protection against
bullying, admissions, and expulsion); Alanna M. Jereb, Note, The Bathroom Right
for Transgender Students and How the Entire LGBT Community Can Align to
Guarantee This, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 585, 587-90, 592-97 (2017) (consid-
ering Title IX protections only as they regard transpersons' use of bathrooms);
Adele P. Kimmel, Title DM An Imperfect but Vital Tool to Stop Bullying of LGBT
Students, 125 YALE L.J. 2006, 2024-27 (2016) (examining Title IX's protection
only in the limited sphere of anti-LGBT bullying); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Squaring
Faith and Sexuality: Religious Institutions and the Unique Challenge of Sports, 34
LAW & INEQ. 385, 401-03, 420-22 (2016) (considering Title IX possibilities only in
relation to athletics at religious educational institutions).
36 See Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approacl. The Limits of
Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JusT. 83, 85 (2008)
("Although formal equality-treating trans people the same as non-trans people
despite gender non-conformity-may reduce instances of blatant discrimination,
it also serves to conceal and perpetuate the underlying stigmatization of non-
conformity to gender norms."); Levit, supra note 27, at 869 ("[The [formal equality]
model is fraught with difficulties."); see also Adler, The Gay Agenda, supra note
29, at 192 (criticizing the LGBT rights movement's use of formal equality strate-
gies, and warning of negative long-term effects of their use).
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the Trump Administration's revocation of Obama-era Title IX
guidelines is thought to have added turbulence to the process
of using Title IX to protect queer students.3 7 But as this Part
will show, the administration's actions have been largely
innocuous.
In order to demonstrate that LGBT students are continu-
ously deprived of the benefits of educational opportunities, one
must first determine when such deprivation occurs. Part III
therefore lays this necessary foundation by examining Su-
preme Court cases expressing the Court's understandings of
when the benefits of educational opportunities have been de-
nied. By doing so, it will establish a coherent concept of the
benefits of educational opportunities and illuminate when they
have been withheld.
Against that backdrop, Part IV argues that queer students
have been ubiquitously denied educational benefits. It will
document several examples in which LGBT students are de-
prived of equal access to resources, services, and opportunities
guaranteed to them under Title IX. The remainder of the Part
offers an image of an education model, including example ser-
vices, that Title IX might require from an educational institu-
tion to ensure that LGBT students are not denied core
educational benefits.
I
THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TITLE IX
Establishing the backdrop for the remainder of this Note's
analysis, this Part begins by presenting the differences between
the two most prominent theories of equality in legal scholar-
ship: formal and substantive equality. Charting one of this
Note's focal claims, the latter sections of this Part assert that
the core theory at the heart of Title IX is substantive equality-
the equalizing of outcomes rather than processes, and the pos-
sible use of affirmative interactions and remedial policies to
accomplish this. These subparts will demonstrate that as in-
tended, written, and applied, Title IX takes a substantive equal-
ity approach to formulating solutions to discrimination within
educational settings.
37 See, e.g., Logan Casey, After Tr-ump Rescinds Title IX Guidance, What's Next
for Transgender Students' Rights?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2017/03/01/after-trump-
rescinds-title-ix-guidance-whats-next-for-transgender-students-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/UU2A-ZAQV].
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A. The Debate Around Equality
Since the Senate enacted Title IX in 1972, feminist schol-
ars have debated the characteristics of "equality" guaranteed
by its text.38 Within wider feminist theory there may be as
many understandings of equality as there are feminists.3 9
However, with regards to Title IX, feminist understandings of
equality fall into two major categories: formal equality and sub-
stantive equality. 40
The theory of formal equality is rooted in the principle of
equal treatment.4 1  As summarized by Professor Catharine
MacKinnon, the principle holds "if one is the same, one is to be
treated the same."4 2 Thus, in feminist legal theory, formal
equality emphasizes "same-treatment solutions to sex-based
inequality."4 3 In short, it rejects gender-based classifications
by asserting that women and men are equal and therefore
should be treated as such. 44
As a part of formal equality feminists' rejection of gender-
based classifications, during the 1970s, they downplayed and
de-emphasized biological differences between the genders, par-
ticularly pregnancy. 45 Indeed, formal equality feminists char-
acterized pregnancy as a "temporary disability" in order to
38 See, e.g., Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the
Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 30-31 (2000) [hereinafter
Brake, Sex Equality in Sport] (noting different interpretations regarding the type of
equality required by Title IX).
39 See David S. Cohen, Title IX. Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARv. J.L. &
GENDER 217, 259 (2005) (collecting examples and concluding, "[t]here are almost
as many strands of feminist theory as there are feminist scholars"), cf. Deborah L.
Brake, Title IX as Pragmatic Feminism, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 513, 514 (2007)
[hereinafter Brake, Pragmatic Feminism] (describing Title IX as pragmatic-"an
example of liberal feminism, special treatment, structuralism, dominance femi-
nism and different voice feminism").
40 See Rutherford, supra note 34, at 1073 (describing various definitions of
equality).
41 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History
Through the Lens of the California Law Review, 100 CAL. L. REv. 381, 392 (2012)
(summarizing formal equality's principle of justice as "similarly-situated people
should be treated alike even if as a result of different circumstances they are
affected differently by that same treatment").
42 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALIY 4-5 (2001). See also Rutherford,
supra note 34, at 1072 ("Formal equality calls for identical treatment, and does
not allow for existing differences, while substantive equality requires individual-
ized treatment to yield equal opportunity.").
43 Brake, Sex Equality in Sport. supra note 38, at 26.
44 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 41, at 392 ("Women are, for virtually all
purposes that matter, the same as men, and thus should have all of the same the
[sic] rights and entitlements that men have. The same means no less than men,
but also no more . ...
45 See id.
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advocate for and support sex-neutral solutions.46 The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 best illustrates this formal
equality position.47 The statute proposed to treat pregnant wo-
men equally to men with "comparably disabling conditions."4 8
Formal equality's central goal can also be characterized as
facial equality; that statutes or processes should be made to
apply equally, rather than engender equal outcomes. 49 Conse-
quently, a common critique has been that formal equality does
not ensure any improvements of substantive outcomes.5 0
Other feminist scholars have been vocal in criticizing formal
equality for its inability to address gender-related differences. 5 1
Without addressing these fundamental differences, they con-
tend, "[flormal equality . . . can effect only limited change." 52
Responding to formal equality's failure to initiate substantive
change, during the 1980s, critical race theorists and feminist
scholars began advocating for a theory of equality that consid-
ered "substantive circumstances."53
Critical race theory (CRT) developed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s to undertake the project of exposing "how law was
a constitutive element of race itself," and considering "how law
constructed race."5 4 Central to this project was the belief that
formal equality theories-embedded in traditional civil rights
discourse-had failed to materially change the conditions of
46 Id. at 393.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See Jones, supra note 29, at 24 (summarizing Professor Kimberl6 Cren-
shaw's comments on the formal equality doctrine within the civil rights
movement).
50 MARTHA CHAMAILAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1 (3d ed. 2012)
(summarizing criticisms that formal equality "has done little to change the reality
of most women's lives"); Bartlett, supra note 41, at 393; Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20
YALE J.L. & FEMImSM 1, 3 (2008) ("'[Equality,' reduced to sameness of treatment or
a prohibition on discrimination, has proven an inadequate tool to resist or upset
persistent forms of subordination and domination.").
51 See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102
IOWA L. REv. 1633, 1645 (2017) ("Consequently, a formally equal system, for
example, may afford identical rights and treatment to all 'persons,' yet it may still
be functionally discriminatory when the people invoking those rights face very
different paths and obstacles due to their race, gender, or other characteristics.").
52 Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 247 (1987); see also Fineman, supra note 50, at 3 (describing formal equal-
ity's inability to address economic and social disparities amongst groups).
53 Bartlett, supra note 41, at 393.
54 CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOvEMENT 3
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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African Americans.5 5 To critical race theorists such as Profes-
sor Kimberl6 Crenshaw, true equality was substantive, in that
it "stresses equality as a result, and looks to real consequences
for [subordinated classes, such as] African-Americans."56
In a similar vein, feminist support for substantive equality
advocated for an equality principle that "address[ed] the actual
material or 'substantive' circumstances of women, not just
their 'formal' treatment."5 7 This approach originated in the
context of pregnancy.58 There, substantive equality feminists
argued that pregnant women should be specially accommo-
dated, despite a lack of comparable accommodations for
men.59
As a theory, substantive equality rejects the sameness of
treatment approach and rather looks to the outcomes of rules
while taking into "account . .. differences to avoid differential
impacts that are considered unfair."6 0 Substantive equality's
core goal, then, is to equalize outcomes,6 ' and it may include
"removing barriers which prevent individuals from performing
according to their abilities."62 In sum, substantive equality
55 Brake, Sex Equality in Sport, supra note 33, at 26 ("Equal protection...
had its moorings in a formal equality perspective .. . ").
56 Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination
Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITr. L. REV.
455, 464-65 (2005) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1341 (1988)).
57 Bartlett, supra note 41, at 393; see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLU-
SION OF EQUALIY: THE RHETORIc AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 3 (1991) (describing
substantive equality as an "attempt[ ] to ensure that the effects of rules as they
will be applied will place individuals in more or less equal positions"): Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Essay, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1, 5, 11
(2011) (detailing how a substantive equality approach seeks to right "material and
dignitary deprivations and violations").
58 See Bartlett, supra note 41, at 393.
59 See id.
60 ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALIsM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 55-56 (1994) ("[F]ormal equality .... targets the wrong evil. . .
[because the concept of] sameness between men and women . . . will be simply
irrelevant to the true causes and nature of women's inequality or will backfire and
harm rather than help women." (footnote omitted)); Cohen, supra note 39, at 263
(quoting KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
265 (3d ed. 2002)).
61 Substantive equality seeks to equalize outcomes as much as possible but
may not concretely require equal outcomes. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Essay,
Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 5 (1994) ("Substantive equality theory
focuses on outcomes, but does not necessarily require identical or mirror-image
outcomes. Some substantive equality advocates favor equal treatment in some
situations and special accommodation in others . . . .").
62 Jessica E. Jay, Women's Participation in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives,
7 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 24 (1997).
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seeks to fully level the playing field and may favor affirmative
interventions or remedial policies to do So. 6 3
B. Title IX's Substantive Equality Mandate
Though some scholars have suggested that Title IX is prag-
matic-that is, encompassing multiple theories of equality6 4 -
most scholars fall into one of the two aforementioned camps,
arguing that Title IX is rooted in either a formal or substantive
equality guarantee.6 5 The debate surrounding the equality
that Title IX guarantees is crucial since it determines whether
institutions must undertake affirmative interventions or simply
apply neutral rules.66
On one hand, some scholars looking to Title IX's historical
setting have determined that the statute guarantees formal
equality. 6 7 They support this conclusion with the fact that the
formal equality approach was dominant in the 1970s when
Title IX was passed.6 8 Moreover, these scholars argue that the
substantive equality approach would develop almost a decade
after the statute's enactment.6 9
However, the overwhelming consensus in both scholarship
and case law has been that Title IX encompasses a substantive,
or mostly substantive equality approach. 70 For example, in
63 Stancil, supra note 51, at 1645 (summarizing the views of substantive
equality theorists).
64 See, e.g., Brake, Pragmatic Feminism, supra note 39, at 513 (describing
Title IX as a "pluralistic and pragmatic" combination of many approaches to
feminist legal theory).
65 Compare Cohen, supra note 39, at 265 (arguing that Title IX looks beyond
formal equality and reaches into the realm of substantive equality), with Dionne L.
Koller, Not Just One of the Boys: A Post-Feminist Critique of Title IX's Vision for
Gender Equity in Sports, 43 CONN. L. REV. 401, 417-18 (2010) ( "Title IX at its core
takes a formal equality approach.").
66 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 39, at 265-66 (discussing how formal equality
requires merely acting neutrally, while substantive equality requires affirmative
action).
67 See, e.g., Koller, supra note 65, at 406 (stating that Title IX "ultimately
rest[s] on a formal equality approach which requires women and girls to assimi-
late into the male-constructed, varsity model for sport"); see also Monica J.
Stamm, Note, A Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex Schools for Pregnant Girls, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1216 (1998) (arguing that "Title IX follows the formal equal-
ity model").
68 See Koller, supra note 65, at 419.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN'S
SPORTS REVOLUTION 8 (2010) [hereinafter Brake, GETING IN THE GAME] ("Title IX
stands out as a law that has had a transformative impact .... It has escaped
many of the pitfalls of other discrimination laws by employing measures of equal-
ity that are substantive and results oriented."); see Deborah L. Brake, Back to
Basics: Excavating the Sex Discrimination Roots of Campus Sexual Assault, 6
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support of this conclusion, Professor David Cohen demon-
strates the statute's substantive equality paradigm in the con-
text of its applicability to college athletics.7 1 He makes the
point that courts have "understood that judging women's
equality based on the seemingly neutral measure of interest [in
athletic participation] would defeat the purpose of Title IX."72
Instead, courts have noted that "[i]nterest and ability rarely
develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a function of opportunity
and experience."73 This reasoning looks towards women's spe-
cific circumstances that would make applying a neutral rule
inadequate; a key feature of the substantive equality
approach.74
Similarly, Title IX's substantive equality undercurrents are
found in its sexual harassment applications.7 5 Under a formal
equality approach, in cases of sexual assault, a court would
inquire whether similarly situated students were treated
equally.7 6 Consequently, an institution would fulfill its Title IX
obligations if it failed to remedy sexual harassment in both
male- and female-victim cases.7 7 To the contrary, in practice,
once an institution receives actual notice of sexual harass-
ment, under Title IX, administrators are required to take af-
firmative obligations to remedy such harassment.7 8 This
TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 7, 25 (2017); Cohen, supra note 39, at 263; see
also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1322 (1991) (noting the Supreme Court "has begun to interpret statu-
tory sex equality mandates in light of substantive equality goals"). Some scholars
have argued Title IX encompasses elements of both models of equality. See
Deborah L. Brake & Verna L. Williams, The Heart of the Game: Putting Race and
Educational Equity at the Center of Title IX, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 199, 213
(2008) ("Specifically, the statute also has substantive equality aspects that seek to
reform the institutional structures that facilitate inequality." (emphasis added)).
Indeed, even in her Article-length treatment of Title LX's formal equality core,
Professor Koller concedes that "to some extent" Title IX takes an approach differ-
ent from the formal equality approach dominant in antidiscrimination law. See
Koller, supra note 65, at 421-24 (detailing the substantive equality elements of
the statute).
71 See Cohen, supra note 39, at 263.
72 Id. (quoting Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996)).
73 Cohen, 101 F.3d at 179.
74 See Cohen, supra note 39, at 263.
75 See id. at 265-66.
76 See id.
77 Recall that formal equality only requires sameness of treatment. Hence if
both men and women are provided inadequate services, formal equality has been
satisfied.
78 See Cohen, supra note 39, at 266-67 ("In requiring schools to do so, the
Court has imposed on schools a mandate that appreciates the damaging effects
that peer sexual harassment on students' education, particularly that of girls and
young women.").
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represents an approach that is fundamentally deeper than for-
mal equality.79
Title IX's remedial purposes are further evidence of the
statute's substantive equality objectives.8 0 Title IX was en-
acted to accomplish two remedial goals: "avoid[ing] the use of
federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and
"provid[ing] individual citizens [with] effective protection
against those practices."8 1 The legislative history of Title IX
evidences congressional concern with developing a "strong and
comprehensive"8 2 remedy to the "persistent, pernicious dis-
crimination which [was] serving to perpetuate second-class cit-
izenship for American women,"8 3 rather than solely focusing on
the formal equality of female students.8 4
In fact, a formal equality model of Title IX would fail to
achieve either of the remedial goals Congress sought to accom-
plish when enacting the statute.8 5 Simply ensuring that the
processes of education are facially neutral does very little to
ensure equality of educational opportunity.8 6 And courts have
consistently agreed.8 7 In De La Cruz v. Tormey, for instance,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a formalist ap-
proach to Title IX equality. 8 In Tormey, female students and
prospective students brought a claim alleging that defendant
college officials violated Title IX by refusing to establish on-
campus child care facilities.8 9 The court found that responsi-
bilities for child care overwhelmingly fell on women, such that
the "absence of child care facilities effectively bars them from
obtaining the benefits of higher education."9 0 Though the
court did not explicitly hold that the defendants were required
79 Id. ("[L]ooking behind a practice that appears neutral on its face and re-
quiring a remedy that attempts to substantively equalize educational access, Title
IX goes far afield of... formal equality theory.").
80 See, e.g., Claudia S. Lewis, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments:
Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language with Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1043, 1046 (1983) (discussing the remedial nature of Title IX and
collecting congressional record evidence that Congress intended the statute to be
remedial).
81 Id.
82 118 CONG. REc. 5806 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
83 Id. at 5804.
84 Cohen, supra note 39, at 271.
85 See supra note 65.
86 See, e.g., Cohen supra note 39, at 261 (discussing how facially neutral laws
can "reinforce the status quo of inequality").
87 See Koller, supra note 65, at 423 ("Courts frequently have endorsed the
substantive, or 'structural' equality elements of Title IX.").
88 See 582 F.2d 45, 56-57 (9th Cir. 1978).
89 Id. at 47.
90 Id.
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to establish child care facilities, the opinion implies an expan-
sive and substantive approach to Title IX equality.9 ' In con-
trast, the dissent offered a formal equality approach arguing
that the plaintiffs had been treated no differently than male
students. 92
Collectively, in light of this evidence, it is clear that Title IX
is rooted in a substantive equality mandate. Establishing this
opens the possibilities for imposing affirmative obligations and
remedial requirements aimed at ensuring equality of out-
comes.9 3 Against this foundation, the following Parts will
demonstrate that Title IX extends to discrimination against
LGBT students, that the educational system fails to provide
LGBT students equal benefits, and that Title IX's substantive
equality underpinnings demand that schools take affirmative
steps to remedy these inequalities.
II
"ON THE BASIS OF SEX"
On its face, neither sexual orientation nor gender identity
are included within the text of Title IX.94 Nevertheless, over the
past decade, courts have expanded Title IX's applicability to
provide protection against anti-LGBT discrimination.9 5 This
Part will establish that queer students are indeed covered by
Title IX protections by examining seminal cases in the expan-
sion, and it will summarize the approaches courts have taken
to reach such outcomes. The Part will then address the debate
around the 2017 Trump Administration's revocation of Obama-
era Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Guidance which explicitly
stated that Title IX applied to transgender students.
91 Id at 60-61.
92 Id. at 75.
93 Brake, GETITNG IN THE GAME, supra note 70, at 17 ("In forsaking gender
blindness for a more gender-conscious, result-oriented model, Title IX has chosen
substantive equality over formal equality. This choice has created the potential
for expanding . . . sports participation and inciting broad-based cultural
transformation . . . .").
94 Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 reads in part: "No person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (2012).
95 See, e.g., Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159-60
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that claims of discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion are covered by Title IX); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d
1165, 1169-71 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that harassment based on a victim's
homosexuality can constitute sexual harassment under Title IX).
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A. The Title VII and Title IX Helix
Since the 1990s, courts have struggled to differentiate be-
tween discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity and discrimination on the basis of sex for Title VII and
Title IX purposes.9 6 Many courts have held that the two claims
intertwine,9 7 though a minority have undertaken the effort of
seeking to extract the claims from one another.98
Whatever the approach, in applying Title IX to protect
queer students, courts are guided by interpretations of Title
VII.99 As such, twin landmark decisions confirming Title VII's
application to sexual orientation and gender identity workplace
discrimination-Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.'m and EEOC v.
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.1o'-strongly suggest
96 See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009)
("[T]he line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination 'be-
cause of sex' can be difficult to draw."); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403,
408 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[Tihe line between discrimination because of sexual orienta-
tion and discrimination because of sex is hardly clear.").
97 See, e.g., Videckis, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 ("Simply put, the line between
sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is 'difficult to draw' be-
cause that line does not exist, save as a lingering and faulty judicial construct.").
But see Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (arguing that plain-
tiffs should not be allowed to "bootstrap protection for sexual orientation discrimi-
nation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine,
and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine").
98 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 708 (7th Cir. 2016)
(collecting examples where courts have "tease[d] apart" sexual orientation and sex
discrimination claims).
99 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex reL Zinring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.1 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting cases: "This Court has also looked to its Title
VII interpretations of discrimination in illuminating Title IX"); G.G. ex reL Grimm
v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 718 (4th Cir. 2016) ("We look to case
law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in evaluating
a claim brought under Title IX.").
100 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holding that Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); see Alison Frankel, 2nd Circuit
Demolishes Key DOJ Argument Against Workplace Protection for Gays, REUTERS
(Feb. 26, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-ote-titlevii/
2nd-circuit-demolishes-key-doj-argument-against-workplace-protection-for-
gays-idUSKCNIGA20Y [https://perna.ce/8C5A-FVMS].
101 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding employment discrimination
based on transgender status violates Title VII and that businesses may not use
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to discriminate against transgender em-
ployees); see Patrick Dorrian, Bias Against Transgender Workers Is Sex Bias
Under Federal Law, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://
bnanews.bna.com/daly-labor-report/bias-against-transgender-workers-is-sex-
bias-under-federal-law-I [https: //perma.cc/H3T2-GPXX] (discussing R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. and, more broadly, EEOC's successes in enforcing
antidiscrimination suits on behalf of LGBT individuals in federal courts).
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that Title IX's application to LGBT students will increase in the
near future. 102
B. "Sex" as Sexual Orientation
At present, courts that have extended Title IX protections
to Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual (LGB) students have done so
under two distinct rationales originating in Title VII jurispru-
dence.103 The first holds that anti-LGB harassment occurs be-
cause victims do not conform to gender stereotypes. 10 4 The
second purports that anti-LGB harassment is sex discrimina-
tion per se. 0 5
1. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex Stereotyping
Discrimination
The gender-stereotyping rationale has its roots in the Title
VII case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 0 6 There, the Supreme
Court held that sex discrimination included instances where
employees were evaluated on their conformity to stereotypes
associated with their gender.1 0 7
Price Waterhouse involved allegations that a female em-
ployee was denied partnership due to her failure to satisfy her
managers' idea of femininity. 0 s The plaintiff, Ann Hopkins,
had been denied partnership for two consecutive years despite
continually being praised for her ability and record. 0 9 In her
first partnership evaluation, Hopkins's mostly male managers
criticized her interpersonal skills, describing her as "macho,"
claiming she "overcompensated for being a woman," and advis-
ing her to take "a course at charm school.""10
102 In addition, on Wednesday, March 7, 2018, LGBT-rights organization
Lambda Legal filed a complaint in the Eighth Circuit which, if successful, would
reaffirm Title VII's application to sexual orientation. See Horton v. Midwest Geri-
atric Mgmt., LLC, No. 4:17CV2324 JCH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209996 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 21, 2017) (dismissing Horton's sex discrimination claim); Lambda Legal
Presses Fight for Federal LGBT Ernployment Discrimination Protection in New Ap-
peals Court Case, LAMBDA LEGAL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.lambdalegal.org/
blog/20180307_1gbt-employment-discrimination-appeal [https://perma.cc/
M5V2-RXK7].
103 See Kimmel, supra note 35, at 2015-16.
104 Id.
105 Id.; see also Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159
(C.D. Cal. 2015) ([iClaims of sexual orientation discrimination are gender stereo-
type or sex discrimination claims.").
106 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
107 Id. at 250-51.
108 Id. at 233-34.
109 Id. at 234.
110 Id. at 235.
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Explaining the decision to hold Hopkins's partnership can-
didacy, one partner suggested Hopkins could improve her
chances upon review if she would "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'I 1 Based in part upon the
partner's comments, the Court concluded that Price
Waterhouse's management had discriminated against Hopkins
on the basis of her sex. 112 Specifically, Price Waterhouse had
violated Title VII by impermissibly basing an employment deci-
sion upon Hopkins's conformity to stereotypical notions of
womanhood. 1 13
Courts subsequently interpreted Price Waterhouse to mean
that bullying based upon stereotypical notions of gender iden-
tity or behavior, violate Title IX if it sufficiently disrupts a stu-
dent's ability to receive the benefits of an education
opportunity. 114 Within these interpretations, courts have di-
verging theories on how LGB students violate gender
stereotypes.
A first school of thought holds that all LGB persons break
gender stereotypes on account of their sexuality.11 5 Courts
reason that persons are expected to be sexually attracted to
members of the opposite sex, and therefore, it is contrary to
gender stereotypes for a girl to be attracted to girls and vice
versa.11 6 Thus, if a student identifies as homosexual, they "will
unquestionably be living in a manner contrary to society's gen-
eral assumptions about men and women.""17
To illustrate, in Videckis v. Pepperdine University, a Califor-
nia district court applied this approach in a Title IX suit
111 Id.
112 Id. at 258.
113 Id.
114 See Kimmel, supra note 35, at 2019 ("Under the gender stereotyping ratio-
nale, courts interpret what appears to be sexual orientation discrimination-such
as anti-gay epithets-as actually based on sexist stereotypes about masculinity
and femininity."); see also Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and
Versatiles: What Straight Views of Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexual-
ity Claims Under Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714, 720 (2013) (explaining how
the gender stereotyping rationale in Price Waterhouse applies to discrimination
against sexual minorities).
115 Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 114, at 720.
116 See, e.g., Centola v. Potter 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002)
("[S]tereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about
the proper roles of men and women. . . . The gender stereotype at work here is
that 'real' men should date women, and not other men.").
117 Daniel B. Weddle, You'd Be Okay if You Weren't So Gay: Ending the Special
Treatment of LGBT Students Under Title IX, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 425, 431
(2013).
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brought by two lesbian basketball team members. 118 The
plaintiffs alleged that after the team coaches discovered they
were dating, the coaches harassed and discriminated against
the women.119 In response to the suit, Pepperdine University
moved to dismiss on the basis that Title IX only covered dis-
crimination on the basis of gender and not on the basis of
sexual orientation. 1 2 0
The Court rejected Pepperdine's motion to dismiss. 12 1 It
reasoned that gender-stereotype discrimination is broad and
that "[s]tereotypes about lesbianism, and sexuality in general,
stem from a person's views about the proper roles of men and
women-and the relationships between them." 1 2 2 Because the
coaches' discrimination stemmed from the plaintiffs' lesbian
relationship, and therefore the perceived failure to conform to
the stereotype that women date men, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs had a sound claim for discrimination under Title
IX. 123
Though the court in Videckis used the plaintiffs' lesbian
relationship as evidence that they broke sex stereotypes, some
scholars parse discrimination resulting from a person's same-
sex relationship and discrimination based on a person's failure
to conform to stereotypes about their gender as separate theo-
ries.1 2 4 They find that sex stereotypes and same-sex attraction
and relationships, while intertwined and overlapping, are not
so interchangeable. 125 This approach is particularly applicable
118 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
119 Id. at 1154.
120 Id. at 1157.
121 Id. at 1163.
122 Id. at 1160.
123 Id.
124 For instance, Professor Brian Soucek has explained the view as a difference
between the "associational theory" of LGBT discrimination, that is discrimination
because of the sex of a person's partner (i.e., a same-sex relationship), and dis-
crimination based on a failure to conform to gender stereotype. See Brian Soucek,
Hively's Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J.F. 115, 118-21 (2017). Relatedly,
some have argued that discrimination based on homosexuality cannot constitute
gender stereotyping-and by extension sex discrimination-because heterosexu-
ality is assumed of both genders as opposed to one. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 370 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("To put the matter
plainly, heterosexuality is not afemale stereotype; it is not a male stereotype; it is
not a sex-specific stereotype at all.").
125 Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking
Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orienta-
tion, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 67 (2000) ("Discrimination against lesbians
and gay men often is motivated more by how we violate societal sex and gender
norms than it is by the much narrower characteristic of specifically how, and with
whom, we have sex. Same-sex sexual expression is just one facet of lesbian and
gay identity. . . .").
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to the discrimination faced by young LGB children, who, while
breaking sex stereotypes, may be too young to make the theory
of "heterosexuality as sex stereotype" applicable. For instance,
Professors Anthony Verona and Jeffrey Monks make the point
that for many queer youth, homophobic bullying preexists
same-sex attraction, and is, instead, the result of a "failure to
conform to the gender norms assigned to their sex (Le., their
degree of masculinity if they are male or femininity if they are
female)."126 They further note, "[mlany gay boys, long before
engaging in same-sex sexual activity, share the experience of
being taunted and teased for 'acting queer' or 'looking like a
faggot' simply because they are not as aggressive or masculine-
appearing as other boys." 12 7
Courts adopting this reasoning focus mainly on a student's
behavior, rather than their same-sex attraction, as evidence of
their breaking sex stereotypes. 1 28 The court in Montgomery v.
Independent School District No. 709, for example, took such an
approach.1 2 9 In Montgomery, the plaintiff brought a Title IX
suit alleging that between kindergarten and tenth grade he was
subjected to incessant verbal and physical abuse from his
peers. 3 0 He further alleged that despite reporting these inci-
dents, few of his harassers received more than verbal
reprimands.131
In rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss the Title IX
claim, the court highlighted the fact that the plaintiff began
facing verbal harassment as early as kindergarten. 1 3 2 The
court noted that it was "highly unlikely that at that tender age
plaintiff would have developed any solidified sexual preference,
or for that matter, that he even understood what it meant to be
'homosexual' or 'heterosexual.'"133 Instead, the court found it
was more plausible that the harassment was based on the
126 Id. at 67-68.
127 J& at 67.
128 See, e.g., Bowe v. Eau Claire Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-746-jdp, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 61496, at *7-9 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 24, 2017) (describing homophobic
insults as "gender stereotype slurs"); N.K. v. St. Mary's Springs Acad. of Fond du
Lac Wis., Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (finding support for
the gender stereotyping rationale where the plaintiffs classmates teased him be-
cause of his homosexuality and effeminacy).
129 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000).
130 Id. at 1084-86.
131 Id. at 1086.
132 Id. at 1090.
133 Id.
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plaintiffs failure to conform to his peers' stereotypes of
masculinity. 1 3 4
2. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination Per Se
Under the second and less popular rationale,1 3 5 courts
have treated discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
as "straightforward sex discrimination claims."136 In Ray v.
Antioch Unified School District, for instance, the court extended
Title IX protections to homophobic harassment based upon the
similarities between discrimination on the basis of sex and dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.1 3 7 It reasoned
that there was no "material difference" between sexual harass-
ment against female students and homophobic bullying
against male students. "In both instances," noted the court,
"the conduct is a heinous response to the harasser's perception
of the victim's sexuality, and is not distinguishable . . . ."138
The court went on to conclude that "it is reasonable to infer
that the basis of the attacks was a perceived belief about Plain-
tiffs sexuality, i.e. that Plaintiff was harassed on the basis of
sex." 3 9
In his seminal article on sexual orientation discrimination,
Professor Andrew Koppelman introduced an alternative theory
supporting the "sex discrimination per se" approach.1 4 0 Pro-
fessor Koppelman reasons that anti-gay discrimination is sex
discrimination if the conduct being discriminated against
would be tolerated in a person of the opposite sex.' 4 1 Thus, "[ilf
a business fires Ricky . .. because of his sexual activities with
Fred, while these actions would not be taken against Lucy if
she did exactly the same things with Fred, then Ricky is being
discriminated against because of his sex."1 4 2
134 Id.
135 See Kimmel, supra note 35, at 2015 n.45 (noting all cases considering the
gender stereotype theory have accepted it, though there is an even split between
the eight cases that have addressed the sex discrimination per se rationale).
136 Id. at 2020; see also Soucek, supra note 124, at 121 n.36 (collecting
sources demonstrating that "sexual orientation discrimination" is inherently tied
to the "subordination of women," and preservation of gender norms).
137 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
138 Id. at 1170.
139 Id.
140 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 208 (1994).
141 Id.
142 Id.
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Recently, Koppelman's theory has found support in both
Title IX and Title VII cases. 143 Consider again the Videckis
case. 1 4 4 In addition to the plaintiffs' gender stereotyping claim,
the court also found that the plaintiffs stated a claim for sex
discrimination per se. 1 4 5 The court reasoned that sex discrimi-
nation can "be defined as treating someone differently simply
because that person's sex is different from a similarly situated
person of the opposite sex."14 6 Accordingly, the coaches' ani-
mosity towards the lesbian plaintiffs was sex discrimination
per se since it would not have occurred if the plaintiffs "had
been males dating females."1 47
C. "Sex" as (Trans)Gender Identity
Courts have similarly extended Title IX protections to
transgender students by interpreting discrimination against
transpersons as both sex discrimination per se and sex stere-
otyping. 148 This section summarizes both approaches.
1. Gender Identity Discrimination as Sex Discrimination
Per Se
Underlying this interpretation is the understanding that a
person's status as transgender is inherently sex based. 149 That
is, transgender status is the result of the discordance between
a person's sex assigned at birth and the sex with which they
identify.1 5 0 Consequently, all discrimination against trans-
143 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Flaum, J., concurring) (finding sexual orientation is sex discrimination within the
Title VII context, because: "Fundamental to the definition of homosexuality is the
sexual attraction to individuals of the 'same sex.' . . . One cannot consider a
person's homosexuality without also accounting for their sex: doing so would
render 'same' and 'own' meaningless.").
144 Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
145 Id. at 1161.
146 id.
147 Id.
148 The First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have recognized
transphobic discrimination as sex discrimination per se. See Plaintiffs Memoran-
dum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 15, G.G.
ex reL Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field document/
120_memo_1inoppto mtd.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TST-S86D].
149 See Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and
Title VII, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007).
150 Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 148, at 16 ("The incongruence be-
tween [Gavin's] gender identity and the sex designated for him at birth is what
makes him transgender. Treating a person differently because of the relationship
between those two sex-based characteristics is literally discrimination on the
basis of 'sex.'").
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gender individuals because of their gender nonconformity can
be considered sex discrimination. 15 1 Illustratively, the previ-
ously discussed Gavin Grimm case made use of this
argument. 1 5 2
The "sex discrimination per se" rationale may also be ex-
tended to students who have undergone gender affirmation
surgery. 15 3 Courts have held that discrimination on the basis
of sex must also encompass discrimination because of a
change of sex. 1 5 4 Justice James Robertson aptly illustrated
this point with an analogy to religious discrimination:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from
Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testi-
fies that he harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews
but only "converts." That would be a clear case of discrimina-
tion "because of religion." . . . Discrimination "because of
religion" easily encompasses discrimination because of a
change of religion. 155
2. Gender-Identity Discrimination as Sex-Stereotype
Discrimination
Utilizing the sex-stereotyping rationale distilled in Price
Waterhouse, the second approach argues that persons are con-
sidered transgender exactly because they transgress stereo-
types of gender-appropriate behavior and appearance.'5 6 This
theory holds that because of their desire to live as the opposite
sex, transgender individuals do not conform to stereotypes
about their assigned sex. 1 5 7 For example, in Whitaker v. Keno-
sha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education, the Sev-
151 Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 526 (D. Conn. 2016)
("Discrimination 'because of sex,'. . . is not only discrimination because of male-
ness and discrimination because of femaleness, but also discrimination because
of the distinction between male and female or discrimination because of the
properties or characteristics by which individuals may be classified as male or
female.").
152 See Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 148, at 16.
153 This distinction is made since presumably a post-operation transperson's
sex assigned at birth and sex identity align, therefore there is no discordance.
154 See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008).
155 Id. at 306.
156 See Whitaker ex reL Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048 (7th Cir. 2017) ("By definition, a transgender individ-
ual does not conform to the sex-based stereotypes of the sex that he or she was
assigned at birth."); Turner, supra note 149, at 563.
157 See, e.g., Finkle v. Howard Cty., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2014)
("[Any discrimination against transsexuals (as transsexuals)-individuals who,
by definition, do not conform to gender stereotypes-is . .. discrimination on the
basis of sex as interpreted by Price Waterhouse.").
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction
granting a transgender high school student's access to the
boys' restrooms. 58 The court reasoned that "[b]y definition, a
transgender individual does not conform to the sex-based ste-
reotypes of the sex that he or she was assigned at birth." 5 9
Consequently, denying the transgender student access to the
restroom of his gender identity amounted to sex discrimina-
tion, violating Title IX. 160
D. The Effect of the 2017 OCR Guidance Recession
On February 22, 2017, the Department of Justice and the
Department of Education jointly withdrew and rescinded 2016
OCR Guidance documents which stated Title IX required that
institutions grant transgender students access to the
restrooms of their gender identity.161 While some predicted
that the rescission would have a negative impact on protections
for transgender students,1 6 2 recent court opinions indicate
that the February 22, 2017 Dear Colleague Letter rescinding
the earlier guidance has had little effect on the extension of
Title IX to cover transphobic discrimination. ' 6 3
The November 2017 opinion in A.H. ex reL Handling v.
Minersville Area School District summarizes the courts' ap-
proach to the 2017 guidance. 16 4 That court found that the
158 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 1050.
161 See OFFICE FOR CrVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. & CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY5F-
UN34] (indicating in this "2017 Guidance" the Departments were "withdraw[ing]
and rescind[ing] the above-referenced guidance documents in order to further and
more completely consider the legal issues involved").
162 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 37; Steve Lee, Widespread Condemnation of
Trump's Rescission of Title IX Guidance Clarifying Protections for Transgender
Students, LGBT WEEKLY (Feb. 23, 2017), http://lgbtweekly.com/2017/02/23/
widespread-condemnation-of-trumps-rescission-of-title-ix-guidance-clarifying-
protections-for-transgender-students/ [https://perma.cc/5PJL-V2ZZ].
163 See A.H. ex reL Handling v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 290 F. Supp. 3d
321, 327 (M.D. Pa. 2017); see also Adams ex reL Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns
Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2018) ("[T]he rescission of the old
guidance without issuing new guidance does not provide any interpretation of
Title IX from the Department of Education."); Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch.
Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 298 (W.D. Pa. 2017) ("On one hand, the 2017 Gui-
dance could be read as a simple rescission of the prior DOE/DOJ's 2015 and
2016 Guidance interpretations, which would mean there is now simply no rele-
vant DOE/DOJ interpretation of the Regulation, and therefore nothing to con-
sider deferring to.").
164 290 F. Supp. 3d at 327; Adams ex rel. Kasper, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1323
(echoing this reasoning).
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2017 guidance did not create any "'new' or different interpreta-
tion of Title IX," nor did it "affirmatively contradict" prior guide-
lines. 1 6 5 Instead, while plaintiffs may still bring Title IX claims
when they are restricted from using bathrooms that are consis-
tent with their gender identity, 6 6 the 2016 guidance cannot be
used to support their claims.1 6 7
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit's Whitaker opinion escaped
conflict with the 2017 guidance rescission.1 68 Strikingly, the
court did not consider the joint DOE/DOJ guidance at all in its
holding.' 6 9 Rather, the court applied the sex-stereotyping the-
ory to find that the defendant school board's policy of denying a
student access to the bathroom of their gender identity, "pun-
ishes that individual for his or her gender non-conformance,
which in turn violates Title IX." 7 0 The court went on to hold
that the school district's policies also subject transgender stu-
dents "to different rules, sanctions, and treatment than non-
transgender students, in violation of Title IX." 71
More recently, a series of four cases between June and
August 2018 provide further evidence that the guidance rescis-
sion has not dampened the use of Title IX to fight LGBT dis-
crimination. Each of the cases, Parents for Privacy v. Dallas
School District No. 2,172 Doe ex reL Doe v. Boyertown Area
School District,173 Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St.
Johns County,17 4 and J.A.W. v. Evansville Vanderburgh School
Corporation,17 ultimately held that transgender students
should have access to facilities that match their gender iden-
tity. Three of the four found that Title IX requires trans-affirm-
ative bath- and locker-room policies, 7 6 while the fourth,
165 A.H. ex rel. Handling, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 327.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Whitaker ex reL Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ.,
858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017).
169 See id.
170 Id. at 1040.
171 Id. at 1049-50.
172 326 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (D. Ore. 2018).
173 897 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2018), revising Doe ex reL Doe v. Boyertown Area
Sch. Dist., 893 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2018).
174 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2018).
175 323 F. Supp. 3d 1030 (S.D. Ind. 2018).
176 See JA.W., 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (indicating that there are situations
where "Tritle IX requires a school to permit a transgender student to use the
restrooms that coincide with his gender identity"); Adams, 318 F. Supp. 3d at
1325 (finding a Title IX violation where a School Board prohibited "a transgender
boy, from using the boys' restroom"); Parents for Privacy, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1106
(finding that "[florcing transgender students to use facilities inconsistent with
their gender identity would undoubtedly harm those students and prevent them
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Boyertown Area School District, punted the question of Title
IX's requirements for trans students. 177
Ultimately, in light of recent cases, it is clear that the 2017
guidance rescission is essentially innocuous, and that Title IX
can still be used as a tool to protect transgender students from
discriminatory school policies.
III
"DENIED THE BENEFITS OF"
This Part begins by examining one of the Supreme Court's
influential cases on Title IX violations, Davis v. Monroe.178 Us-
ing terminology drawn from Davis, this Part then presents a
study of Supreme Court cases in order to elucidate the con-
tours of what it means to "deprive" in the Title IX context, and it
formulates a coherent definition of the "benefits" of an educa-
tion opportunity. Against this framework, this Part finally
demonstrates the American public educational system's ubiq-
uitous failure to ensure that queer students receive benefits
equal to their non-queer counterparts.
A. Davis v. Monroe's Unresolved Questions
In Davis v. Monroe, the Supreme Court examined whether
peer-on-peer harassment provided grounds for a private cause
of action under Title IX. 179 The case arose from facts involving
LaShonda Davis, a fifth-grade student at Hubbard Elementary
School.o8 0 Starting in December 1992, G.F.-a classmate of
LaShonda's, began sexually harassing her by touching her and
by making inappropriate comments. 181 Over the next month,
G.F.'s inappropriate conduct continued and was reported to
from equally accessing educational opportunities and resources" and would con-
stitute sex-stereotyping in violation of Title IX).
177 It should be noted that Boyertown is a revised version of an earlier opinion
that explicitly endorsed the notion that Title IX requires granting trans-students
access to facilities in line with their gender identity. See Doe ex reL Doe v. Boyer-
town Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 536 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that a policy that
barred transgender students from using facilities in line with their gender identity
would violate Title IX); Chan Tov McNamarah, Repeated Victories in the "Bathroom
Wars" During Summer 2018, 2018 LGBT L. NoTES 405, 406-407, https://
lgbtbarny.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-September-Law-Notes.pdf
[https://perma.ce/BG43-E6ME] (documenting reasons for the revision).
178 Davis ex reL LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
632-33 (1999).
179 Id. at 633.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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LaShonda's mother and classroom teacher, who assured that
the school principal had been notified.1 8 2
Over the next four months, G.F.'s pattern of sexual harass-
ment continued towards LaShonda.1 83 She repeatedly re-
ported the incidents to her mother and multiple teachers.1 8 4
Finally, in mid-May, G.F. was charged with sexual battery. 5
In light of months of harassment, LaShonda's family
brought a suit alleging that no disciplinary action had been
taken against G.F. and that the Monroe County Board of Edu-
cation (Education Board) had failed to properly instruct school
personnel on dealing with student sexual harassment.18 6 Spe-
cifically, the complaint alleged that the Board had failed its
Title IX obligations because "[tihe persistent sexual advances
and harassment by the student G.F. upon [LaShonda] inter-
fered with her ability to attend school and perform her studies
and activities,"' 7 and "[tihe deliberate indifference by Defend-
ants to the unwelcome sexual advances of a student upon
LaShonda created an intimidating, hostile, offensive and
abus[ive] school environment."18 8
Considering the facts of the case, the Supreme Court held
that the petitioners could bring a private cause of action under
Title IX, since the Education Board had acted with deliberate
indifference to the known acts of harassment within the
school.' 8 9 However, the Court confined the holding, stating
that an action would only exist for harassment that is so "se-
vere, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to
deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities
or benefits provided by the school."190 The Court further clari-
fied that a deprivation of educational benefits was not re-
stricted to cases of physical exclusion.' 9 ' Instead, an action
that "undermines and detracts from the victims' educational
experience" could also prove to violate Title IX requirements.1 9 2
182 Id at 634.
183 Id.
184 JCL
185 Jd
186 See id. at 635.
187 Id. at 636 (alterations in original).
188 Id. (alterations in original).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 650.
191 d at 651.
192 JCL
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In addition to demonstrating Title IXs substantive equality
underpinnings, 9 3 the Davis decision illuminates the Court's
definition of a Title IX violation: the victim's deprivation of equal
access to some educational opportunity or benefit on the basis of
sex.1 9 4 However, the Court's use of the term "benefit" remained
vague because the Court failed to announce an explicit defini-
tion.s9 5 Two questions then remain: when can it be said that a
student has been deprived of equal access to the benefits of
education? And, in the context of an educational opportunity,
what constitutes a benefit?
B. Analysis-When Is a Student Deprived of Equal Access
to the Benefits of an Educational Opportunity?
To properly analyze this question, this Note collects Su-
preme Court cases by using the term "educational opportunity"
to identify the relevant cases. This generated a list of forty-one
cases, which spanned over fifty years (1954-2017).196 Then,
the cases were divided based on the central topic or element,
including: (1) race; (2) gender classifications; (3) disabilities;
and (4) nationality.1 97 Afterwards, this Note analyzes the fac-
tors the Court used to determine when equal access to an
educational opportunity was given or denied.
This analysis determines that the Court has concluded
that students were deprived equal access to the benefits of an
educational opportunity when: (a) despite equal access to tan-
gible resources, the institution imposes feelings of inferiority or
stigma upon the student; (b) despite equal access to tangible
resources and instruction, the institution deprives a student of
an equal opportunity to achieve their higher goals; and (c) an
institution fails to provide affirmative interventions for a stu-
dent whose personal circumstances prevent them from acces-
sing most, or all of the resources the institution provides their
cohorts.19 8
193 See Cohen, supra note 39, at 266 ("Davis represents a theory of substan-
tive equality at odds with the constitutional theory of formal equality.... Schools
are not required merely to treat similarly situated students alike; rather, they
must work to remedy sexual harassment.").
194 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
195 Id.
196 See infra app.
197 See infra app.
198 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982);
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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1. Educational Opportunities in Cases Involving Race
The Supreme Court's cases on educational opportunities
and race begin with a focus on school segregation, then later
move to affirmative action. 199 The principles revealed in this
line of cases are twofold: (1) equal access to the benefits of
educational opportunities may be barred despite access to
equal tangible resources; and (2) students are deprived equal
benefits of educational opportunities where an institution im-
poses feelings of inferiority or stigma upon them.20 0
In the segregation cases, the Court reveals that the notion
of "educational benefits" incorporates "intangible considera-
tions,"20 1 including the psychological well-being of students.202
Hence, if an educational system serves to stigmatize or impose
feelings of inferiority upon a class of students, equal access to
the benefits of an educational opportunity has been denied.203
Consider Brown v. Board of Education, the landmark case
on school desegregation. 2 0 4 There, the Court dismissed the use
of equal facilities in segregated schools-which, presumably,
would satisfy formal equality.20 5 Instead, the majority found
that Black students were denied equal benefits of educational
opportunities because of segregation's psychological impact.206
By separating students, segregation imposed "a feeling of infer-
iority as to [African American students'] status in the commu-
199 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 189 (1973); Spencer v.
Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1027 (1972); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 404
U.S. 1219, 1219 (Marshall, Circuit Justice 1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 133 (1970); Gaston Cty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 287 (1969); Rogers v.
Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 198-99 (1965); Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (1954).
200 See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that it does."); id. at 494 (finding that a
sense of inferiority generated by the separation tends to permanently retard the
educational and mental development of the affected students and thus deprive
them of benefits they would receive in an integrated school system).
201 Id. at 493.
202 Cf. id. at 493 ("Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment." (emphasis added)).
203 See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-71 (1973) (finding a
private school served an "important educational function," which was under-
mined by the school's discriminatory treatment of interracial couples because
"discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational
process"); cf Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982)
("[Mlinority children can achieve their full measure of success only if they learn to
function in-and are fully accepted by-the larger community.").
204 Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
205 Id. at 488.
206 Id. at 494.
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nity that may affect the hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone." 207 In the Court's opinion, these feelings of infer-
iority affected Black students' motivation to learn, and there-
fore impaired "the educational and mental development of
negro children .. . depriv[ing] them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." 208
2. Educational Opportunities in Cases Involving Gender
The Supreme Court's gender and education cases establish
that students are deprived of equal access to the benefits of
educational opportunities when despite equal access to tangi-
ble resources and instruction, the institution deprives a stu-
dent of an equal opportunity to achieve their higher goals. 209
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan for instance,
the Supreme Court evaluated whether a public state univer-
sity's admission policy of denying males the right to enroll for
credit violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 10 In 1979, the
respondent Joe Hogan applied for admission to enroll in the
university's Nursing Baccalaureate program. 2 11 Though a
qualified registered nurse, Hogan was denied admission on ac-
count of his sex.2 1 2 Despite denying Hogan admission, the
school told Hogan that he and other men, could audit the uni-
versity's classes but would not be allowed to enroll for credit.2 13
As such, however, Hogan was deprived of the ability to receive a
baccalaureate degree in nursing.2 14 Analyzing the facts of the
case, the Court concluded that the state had failed to establish
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the policy's gen-
der-based classification and the policy was therefore
unconstitutional. 2 1 5
The most significant aspect of Mississippi University for
Women was that Hogan had access to equal instruction, and
yet the Court found that he had been denied equal access to
the benefits of an educational opportunity. 2 16 From the facts of
the case, men were allowed to audit all the classes offered at
207 Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan.
1951)).
208 Id. (second alteration in original).
209 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982).
210 Id. at 719.
211 Id. at 720.
212 IcL at 721.
213 I.
214 Id. at 720.
215 Id. at 732.
216 JL
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the Nursing School. 2 17 Arguably then, Hogan had access to the
benefits that the female students had; he would be able to get
taught by the same professors, read and study the same mater-
ials, all while not paying the same tuition.2 18 Nevertheless,
Hogan ultimately could not receive his baccalaureate degree-
thereby depriving him the ability to advance his career. 2 19 By
finding that Hogan was denied "unique benefits,"220 the Su-
preme Court indicated that deprivation of access to the benefits
of education was more than limiting or restricting access to the
same classes or instruction as the other students.22 1 Instead,
deprivation may include liniiting a student's access to the same
ability to achieving their higher goals as their peers. 222
3. Educational Opportunities in Cases Involving Students
with Disabilities
The cases examining students with disabilities establish
two principles: 1) students are deprived of equal access to edu-
cational opportunities when institutions do not provide special
remedial services; and 2) the remedial services provided do not
have to ensure equal outcomes, but instead must be designed
to ensure the student maximizes the student's individual
potential.
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley,2 23 the Supreme Court
considered whether a New York public school's denial of a qual-
ified sign-language interpreter in all of a student's classes de-
nied her the benefits of a "free appropriate public education"
guaranteed under the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975.224 The facts involved Amy Rowley, a deaf first-
grade student. 225 At the beginning of her first year, Amy's par-
ents requested that she be provided a full-time, sign-language
interpreter.226 Evaluations from the school and an indepen-
dent examiner both found that Amy did not need such assis-
tance, and in fact, she "was achieving educationally,
academically, and socially" without it.2 2 7 Nevertheless, Amy's
217 Id at 721.
218 See id. at 721 & n.4.
219 See id. at 723 & n.8.
220 Jd.
221 See id. at 721 & n.4.
222 See id. at 723 & n.8.
223 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
224 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012).
225 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
226 JIL
227 Id. at 185.
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parents insisted that failure to provide a sign-language inter-
preter was a denial of a free appropriate public education. 2 28
The Court disagreed, finding that Amy had been provided
sufficient services, calculated to meet her educational
needs. 229 In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun specified that
sufficient services were given where the "program, viewed as a
whole, offered ... an opportunity to understand and partici-
pate in the classroom that was substantially equal to that given
[to] ... nonhandicapped classmates." 23 0
Rowley's reasoning demonstrates distinctive substantive
equality principles. First, the Court established that to provide
equal access to educational benefits institutions may have to
provide remedial services for students with limited capabili-
ties.2 3 1 Such remedial services are an exemplar of the affirma-
tive interventions substantive equality requires. 232 Secondly,
the Court provides that these services do not have to ensure
equal outcomes, rather they should be designed to maximize
the individual student's potential. 233 This demonstrates two
tenets of substantive equality: a consideration of an individ-
ual's substantive circumstances and the removal of innate
barriers. 2 34
4. Educational Opportunities in Cases Involving
Nationality
Similarly, the Supreme Court's cases examining national-
ity reaffirm the role of affirmative interventions. 235 They estab-
lish that a student has been deprived of equal access to an
educational opportunity where a student's differences or spe-
cial circumstances completely prevent them from receiving
equal benefits from an educational opportunity. 236 In these
cases, a school is required to implement affirmative
interventions. 237
228 Id. at 186.
229 d. at 210.
230 Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231 See i at 189.
232 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
233 See Bartlett, supra note 61, at 5 ("Substantive equality theory focuses on
outcomes, but does not necessarily require identical or mirror-image outcomes.
Some substantive equality advocates favor equal treatment in some situations
and special accommodation in others . . .
234 See supra subpart IA.
235 See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1973).
236 See id.
237 Id.
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In one such case, Lau v. Nichols, the Court scrutinized a
language barrier preventing foreign-born students from receiv-
ing equal benefits from a public school education. 238 In Lau,
the Court examined whether the San Francisco school system's
failure to provide remedial English language instruction to for-
eign-born students, lessened their ability to receive educational
benefits equivalent to those received by their English-speaking,
American-born cohorts.2 39 The Court reasoned that because
educational programs were conducted solely in English, the
Chinese minority "receiv[ed] fewer benefits than the English-
speaking majority," thereby denying them the "meaningful op-
portunity to participate in the educational program." 240 To
ameliorate this issue, the Court held that the San Francisco
school district had to take affirmative steps in order to rectify
the Chinese student's language deficiency. 24 1
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Lau implies that the
Chinese students' own language barrier effectively denied them
the benefits of the instructional program. 242 This can be inter-
preted to mean that a student's own deficiencies or differences
can hamper the student's ability to receive the benefits of an
education, regardless of whether the benefit is offered equally.
Further, the Court's holding requiring the school system to
provide remedial lessons indicates that schools may have to
take affirmative steps with respect to a specific group of stu-
dents for them to equally receive the benefits provided by the
educational opportunity.243
C. Defining the "Benefits" of an Educational Opportunity
In the cases explored, the Court has used the term "bene-
fits" in a wide range of dissimilar situations. 244 Recall that in
Davis the court noted that a decline in LaShonda's academic
performance "provide[d] necessary evidence" that she was de-
238 Id. at 564.
239 Id. at 565.
240 Id. at 568.
241 Jd
242 Id. at 568.
243 Id. at 566 ("[Tihere is no equality of treatment merely by providing students
with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do
not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education.").
244 See Davis ex reL LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
651 (1999) (academic instruction); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
721 (1982) (opportunity to pursue higher education); Bd. Of Educ. v. Rowley ex
reL Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (remedial services); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (psychological well-being).
778 [Vol. 104:745
BRINGING QUEER EQUITY TO SCHOOL
nied equal access to the benefits of the educational program, 24 5
implying that the term "benefits" could refer to academic in-
struction and performance. 24 6 By contrast, in Brown, the
court used the term "benefit" to refer to feelings of psychologi-
cal wellbeing and mental development gained at educational
institutions. 247 And further, in Mississippi University for Wo-
men, the term "benefits" referred to the opportunity to pursue
one's higher goals. 2 4 8
The regulations designed to clarify Title IX's application
and scope are similarly vague and open ended. For example,
34 C.F.R. § 106.31's only suggested definition of "benefit," in-
cludes "any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity" and any
"aid, benefit, or service." 249 This again fails to clearly limit the
definition of "benefits" in any way.
In sum, there appears to be no limited definition of the
benefits of an educational opportunity. This failure to define
the term has allowed courts to apply Title IX protection to a
wide array of educational disparities, and moreover address "a
wide range of intentional unequal treatment."2 50
In Title IX practice, this indefiniteness has allowed courts
to interpret the term "benefits" broadly; using it to refer to any
opportunity, advantage, profit, or gain that a judge finds an
educational institution offers students. And with regards to
LGBT students in particular, the open-endedness of the term
has allowed courts to address a wide range of anti-LGBT insti-
tutional policies. Most recently, for instance, in Board of Edu-
cation v. U.S. Department of Education, a court held that
"access to a communal school bathroom constitutes an 'aid,
benefit[ ], or service[ ]' or a 'right, privilege, advantage, or oppor-
tunity,'"2 5 1 for Title IX purposes.
D. Have Queer Students Been Denied the Benefits of
Educational Opportunities?
This section pauses to offer three vignettes. In doing so,
the aims are twofold: (1) They illustrate a number of ways in
which queer students are denied the benefits of education; and
245 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
246 JGI
247 See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 209-222 and accompanying text.
249 34 C.F.R § 106.31(b) (2018).
250 Vinova v. Henry Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 15-37-GFVT, 2016 WL 4993389, at
*13 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 2016).
251 Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 865 (S.D. Ohio
2016) (alterations in original).
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(2) they demonstrate how a substantive equality approach to
Title IX is better able to effectively help queer students. Under
the framework and definitions distilled prior,2 52 all three stu-
dents have been denied some benefits of an educational oppor-
tunity. Now, consider the following vignettes of Ashley, Leon,
and Mark. 2 5 3
1. Vignette One-Ashley
Ashley is an 8-year-old third grader with Gender
Dysphoria.254 Assigned male at birth, Ashley identifies as
female. To affirm her gender identity, Ashley asks her friends
and teachers to call her "Ashley." Her friends oblige, how-
ever, Ashley's homeroom teacher refuses to call her by her
new name or refer to her using female pronouns. 2 55 Instead,
Ashley's homeroom teacher insists on referring to students
by the name and gender listed on their birth certificate. 256
252 See supra subparts III.B and III.C.
253 For the most part, these vignettes are works of fiction, based loosely on my
own experiences or experiences shared with me by friends. Where I have bor-
rowed from actual instances of anti-LGBT student discrimination, I have cited to
corresponding cases or articles.
254 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
255 In recent years this has occurred with increasing frequency. See, e.g.,
Carlos Granda, Family of Transgender Student, 8, Files Discrimination Suit
Against School, ABC 7 CHi. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://abc7chicago.com/family-of-
transgender-student-8-files-discrimination-suit-against-school/2275378/
[https://perma.cc/7XV-XD8Q]; Eli Rosenberg & Moriah Balingit, A Teacher Re-
fused to Use Transgender Students' Names. His Resignation Was Just Approved.,
WASH. POsT (June 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/educa-
tion/wp/2018/06/1 1/a-teacher-refused-to-use-transgender-students-names-
his-resignation-was-just-approved/ [https://perma.cc/99Z3-KXK8]; Justin Wor-
land, Teacher Says She Was Fired for Refusing to Use Male Name for Transgender
Student, TIME (Nov. 11, 2015), http://time.com/4108948/texas-teacher-trans-
gender-girl/ [https://perma.cc/L8S8-GTFWI; Shots in a Classroom, ABC NEws
(Oct. 7, 2011), https://abcnews.go.com/2020/video/shots-classroom-14694384
[https://perma.cc/WG2S-3CV7] (noting a teacher's refusal to call a transgender
student by her preferred name).
Surprisingly, the Trump Administration's Department of Education has re-
cently released guidance documents acknowledging that misgendering or mis-
naming a transgender student can constitute harassment under Title IX. See
Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for
Civil Rights, to Regional Directors (June 6, 2017), https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/3866816-OCR-Instructions-to-the-Field-
Re-Transgender.html [https://perma.cc/S6WE-EYEA] (describing the refusal to
use a transgender student's preferred name as "hostility based on sex or sex-
stereotyping").
256 Many states refuse to amend birth certificates unless transgender persons
have undergone gender-affirming surgery. Consequently, transgender students
are disparately impacted. Statistics indicate that some 76% of transgender indi-
viduals do not have a birth certificate that matches their gender identity. See
JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANS-
GENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 143 (2011), https://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites
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After discussing her gender identity and her desire to live
as a female with school authorities, Ashley's parents were
told that she would have to use single-stall bathrooms rather
than the girls room. 2 5 7 No other students use the single-stall
bathrooms, and whenever Ashley must use them she feels
singled out and inferior to her peers.
In this vignette, Ashley's school has deprived her of the
benefits of an educational opportunity by imposing feelings of
stigma and inferiority upon her-akin to the manner discussed
in the Supreme Court cases examining race.2 58 First, the
teacher's insistence on misgendering and misnaming Ashley is
both demeaning and dehumanizing. 2 59 In fact, purposefully
misgendering transpersons is widely considered psychological
abuse,260 and misnaming transgender youth is associated with
increased levels of depression and suicidal behavior. 26 1 Sec-
ondly, by restricting Ashley from using the bathroom in line
with her gender identity, the school has both further stigma-
/default/files/Injustice%20at%2Every 0/2OTurn.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWJ5-
CZNH].
257 This vignette is based, in part, on the facts of a recent case brought be-
cause an eight-year-old transgender student was barred from using the girls'
bathroom. See A.H. ex reL Handling v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 290 F. Supp.
3d 321, 324-25 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
258 See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
259 See, e.g., Robin Dembroff& Daniel Wodak, He/She/They/Ze, 5 ERGO 371,
376 (2018) (writing that intentional and unintentional misgendering can result in
"serious physical and psychological health problems"); Stephanie Julia Kapusta,
Misgendering and Its Moral Contestability, 31 HYPATIA 502, 502 (2016) (describing
misgendering as a "harmful, oppressive, and contestable practice"); Kevin A.
McLemore, A Minority Stress Perspective on Transgender Individuals' Experiences
with Misgendering, 3 STIGMA & HEALTH 53, 58 (2018) (noting transgender individu-
als find misgendering "stigmatizing" and psychologically distressing); Kevin A.
McLemore, Experiences with Misgendering: Identity Misclassification of Trans-
gender Spectrum Individuals, 14 SELF & IDENTY 51, 53 (2015) (finding a correla-
tion between frequency of misgendering and negative views of self); Remy Fisher,
Intentionally Misgendering Transgender People Is Considered Violence, AFFINrrY
MAG. (Apr. 17, 2017), http://affinitymagazine.us/2017/04/17/intentionally-
misgendering-transgender-people-is-considered-violence/ [https://perma.cc/
S52T-TXPHI (describing misgendering as "dehumanizing"); Joli St. Patrick, What
You're Really Saying When You Misgender, BODY IS NOT AN APOLOGY (May 26, 2017),
https://thebodyisnotanapology.com/magazine/what-youre-really-saying-when-
you-misgender/ [https://perma.cc/SC7U-6QPF] (explaining the impact of
misgendering).
260 See, e.g., Lucian Clark, Misgendering Is Violence, GENDER TERROR (Jan. 30,
2014), https://genderterror.com/2014/01/30/misgendering-is-violence/
[https://perma.cc/U3Q7-VGDB] (describing misgendering as "a deliberate act to
cause harm, pain, and suffering"); Fisher, supra note 259 (arguing that mis-
gendering falls within the World Health Organization's definition of violence).
261 See Stephen T. Russell et al., Chosen Name Use Is Linked to Reduced
Depressive Symptoms, Suicidal Ideation, and Suicidal Behavior Among Trans-
gender Youth, 63 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 503, 503-04 (2018).
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tized Ashley and deprived her of an opportunity which her non-
queer peers receive. 2 62
When educational institutions stigmatize or cause stu-
dents to feel inferior, this not only harms them psychologically
but also deprives them of an equal educational opportunity. 263
As the Court noted in Brown, one of the "benefits" of an educa-
tional opportunity is helping a child develop a positive sense of
self and grow into a well-adjusted adult.2 6 4 Because she faces
misgendering, misnaming, and exclusion from facilities in line
with her gender identity, Ashley has undeniably been deprived
a benefit based upon her sex-violating her Title IX rights.265
Under a formal equality approach, there may not be any
Title IX solutions to the harassment Ashley faces from her
teacher, or her restriction to a single-stall bathroom. If
Ashley's homeroom teacher treats all students equally-by us-
ing the name and genders on all their birth certificates-then
formal equality has been achieved. 26 6 Ashley has been treated
just the same as any other student, regardless of the student's
gender. In addition, if the school's policy is to limit a student's
bathroom use to the gender markers on the student's birth
certificate, then formal equality will also not solve the discrimi-
natory impact of the rule. 2 6 7
On the other hand, a substantive equality approach to Title
IX takes into consideration Ashley's circumstances, and can
protect her from her teacher's behavior and institutional dis-
crimination. Under a substantive equality model-one that en-
sures equality of outcomes-Title IX can ensure Ashley receives
the same benefit that other students receive: psychological
wellbeing. As such, a substantive equality approach to Title IX
would ensure that Ashley was neither misnamed nor mis-
gendered, and that she was free to use the bathroom of her
choosing.
262 Recall that Bd. ofEduc. v. U.S. Dep't ofEduc. found that restricting a trans
student's bathroom access constitutes straightforward deprivation of an educa-
tional benefit, under the definition of benefit as "any right, privilege, advantage, or
opportunity." See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 178-95 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
265 Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (psychological harms).
266 Under the "sameness-of-treatment" solutions of formal equality, she has
been treated the same. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. Recently,
a School District seeking to bar a transgender student from access to the
restrooms in line with his gender identity made this exact argument. See J.A.W. v.
Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 (S.D. Ind. 2018).
267 See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
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2. Vignette Two-Leon
Leon is a 17-year-old, gay male in his final semester of
high school. Because of his sexuality, Leon has always found
school difficult and demeaning. Every day, Leon faces inces-
sant torment from his peers. Because of his feminine man-
nerisms, Leon's peers relentlessly bully him, using
homophobic slurs like "fag," "homo," and "sissy."26 8 Leon
has tried to discuss the bullying with his teachers and school
counselor, but neither were very helpful. 2 6 9 The school gui-
dance counselor said he was not trained to deal with "those
types of issues."270 Leon's principal went as far as to say,
"boys will be boys," and suggested Leon would not face bully-
ing if he "manned up."2 7 1
In his weekly sexual education class, Leon feels like a
pariah. Because of "no-promo-homo" laws, Leon's sex-ed
teacher cannot discuss sexual health topics that are relevant
to Leon as a gay adolescent. 272 Instead, under state law,
Leon's teacher is required to emphasize that "homosexual
conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle" and that homosexual
conduct is a criminal offense under the Penal Code. 2 7 3
At the end of the semester, Leon is excited about attend-
ing his senior prom. When Leon tells one of his teachers
about his intention to bring a same-sex date to prom, he is
268 Anti-queer bullying is omnipresent in education. Over 85% of LGBT stu-
dents have experienced verbal harassment ("called names [or] threatened"), and
over 25% have experienced physical harassment at school because of their sexu-
ality or gender identity. JOSEPH G. KoscIw ET AL., GLSEN, THE 2015 NATIONAL
SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISExuAL, TRANSGENDER,
AND QUEER YOUTH IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS 22-23 (2016), https://www.glsen.org/
sites/default/files/2015%20National%20GLSEN%202015%20National%20
School%20Climate%20SurveyO/o20%28NSCS%29%20-%20Full%2oReportO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM82-QNC9].
269 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "LIKE WALKING THROUGH A HAILSTORM":
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT YOUTH IN US SCHOOLS 49 (2016), https://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/fles/report-pdf/uslgbt1216web_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L8B7-Z8AG] ("None of the states surveyed required counselors to be
trained on sexual orientation or gender identity, leaving it up to individual coun-
selors to seek out cultural competency training on LGBT issues.").
270 See id.
271 Id. at 22; see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454-55 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that the court would "find it impossible to believe that a female
lodging a similar complaint [of simulated rape] would have received the same
response [as the male victim]" of "boys will be boys").
272 "No Promo Homo" laws refer generally to state and local efforts to restrict
teachers from discussing LGBT related topics in the classroom. See generally
Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2017) (pro-
posing a national campaign to repeal or overrule anti-gay curriculum laws, or "no
promo homo" laws, which, according to the author, violate equal protection).
273 Id.; TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 85.007(b)(2), 163.002(8) (West
2017).
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immediately reprimanded. Later, Leon receives an email
from the principal that states that he will be physically ex-
cluded from his senior prom if he arrives with a male date.
No other seniors bringing opposite-sex dates are similarly
instructed. 2 7 4
In this vignette, Leon has been deprived the benefits of an
education because of his school's failure to ameliorate the
homophobic bullying,27 5 his sexual education class's failure to
provide him with an equal educational advantage, and his
school's prom-date ultimatum that unequally deprived him of
the right to bring a date of his choice. 276
First, if Leon's school can provide other students with
counseling services, then the counselor's lack of training and
subsequent inability to deal with Leon's situation (i.e.
homophobic bullying), has undoubtedly deprived Leon of a ser-
vice that other students have freely received.
Second, if a sexual education class's purpose is to provide
a constructive atmosphere where "pupils learn about their de-
veloping sexuality,"2 7 7 provide a platform for students to de-
velop a "positive and respectful approach to sexuality and
sexual relationships," 2 7 8 and "reduce adolescent sexual risk
274 These aspects are based upon the Title IX case against Christian Brothers
High School (CBHS) for prohibiting a student from bringing a same-sex date to a
homecoming dance. See Emma Margolin, Gay Student Sues School After He
Couldn't Bring Boy to Homecoming, NBC NEws (Sept. 21, 2016, 5:13 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/gay-student-sues-school-after-he-couldn-t-
bring-boy-n652151 [https://perma.cc/D68V-L59X]; see also Complaint, Sander-
son v. Christian Bros. Lasalle High Sch., No. 2:16-cv-02815 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20,
2016).
275 See Vanessa H. Eisemann, Protecting the Kids in the Hall* Using Title IX to
Stop Student-on-Student Anti-Gay Harassment, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 125,
128 (2000) ("While 'authorities react instantly to racist terms' and profanity, 97%
of anti-gay slurs go unchallenged. This discrepancy creates an environment
where gay students' educational experiences are drastically different from those of
their classmates, hampering their educational opportunities." (citing Ann Rostow,
Hostile Hallways: As Schools Ignore Antigay Harassment, Some Lesbians are
Fighting Back, GIRLFRIENDS, June 1999, at 30, 31)).
276 See Letter from Paul D. Castillo, Senior Attorney, Lambda Legal, to Joe
Dyar, Superintendent, Calhoun Cty. Sch. Dist. and Mack Holley, Principal, Alex-
andria High Sch. 1 (Feb. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Castillo Letter], https://
www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/legal-docs/al_20180208_letter-to-calhoun-
county-school-district [https://perma.cc/FF35-W7T2] (demonstrating that bar-
ring same-sex high school students from attending school social functions vio-
lates Title IX).
277 Bryony Brooks, Sex Education in Secondary Schools, 15 HEALTH EDUC. RES.
506, 506-08 (2000) (book review).
278 Herman P. Schaalma et al., Sex Education as Health Promotion: What Does
it Take?, 33 ARcHIvEs SExuAL BEHAV. 259, 259 (2004).
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behaviors," 279 then it is clear that the state's no-promo-homo
laws have denied Leon these benefits. Moreover, because the
law specifically requires teachers to affirmatively emphasize
that homosexuality is both unacceptable and criminal, Leon
has been marginalized 2 8 O-further depriving him of the intan-
gible benefits of affirmation and psychological well-being the
Court discussed in its cases regarding race. 281
Finally, Leon has been deprived of a benefit in the sense
that he was to be physically barred from entering the prom with
a male date. As demonstrated, under the "sex discrimination
per se" approach to extending Title IX, sex discrimination oc-
curs when a student is punished for behavior considered ac-
ceptable when undertaken by the opposite sex. 2 8 2 Viewed in
this way, physically excluding Leon from prom for bringing a
male date, is in fact depriving him of a benefit provided by an
educational opportunity; his Title IX rights have been violated
because a similarly situated female student could attend prom
with a male date free of consequences. 2 8 3
In Leon's case, formal equality will likely fail to amend any
of the Title IX violations that he faces. Here, his counselor's
lack of training on LGBT issues similarly affects all students.
That is, any student whether LGBT or not will receive little help
against anti-LGBT bullying. Because LGBT students, in this
instance Leon, require additional-and in some cases differ-
ent-counseling services than the heterosexual-cisgender ma-
jority, 284 the formal equality model fails to meet their needs,
279 Douglas B. Kirby et al., Sex and HIV Education Programs: Their Impact on
Sexual Behaviors of Young People Throughout the World, 40 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
206, 206 (2007).
280 Id. at 207; see also Amanda Harmon Cooley, Constitutional Representa-
tions of the Family in Public Schools: Ensuring Equal Protection for All Students
Regardless of Parental Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
1007, 1026-28 (2015) (discussing the harms of no-promo-homo laws to LGBT
students and the children of LGBT families).
281 See supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
283 Consider also that in Davis the Court noted that physical exclusion may
deprive students of the benefits of educational opportunities. See supra note 191
and accompanying text.
284 For example, LGBT high school students are at significantly higher risk of
substance abuse, sexually risky behavior, and depression. See Michael P. Mar-
shal et al., Sexual Orientation and Adolescent Substance Abuse: A Meta-Analysis
and Methodological Review, 103 ADDICTION 546, 550 (2008); Margaret Rosario et
al., A Model of Sexual Risk Behaviors Among Young Gay and Bisexual Men: Longi-
tudinal Associations of Mental Health, Substance Abuse, Sexual Abuse, and the
Coming-Out Process, 18 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 444, 450 (2006); see also Karen
M. Jordan, Substance Abuse Among Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and
Questioning Adolescents, 29 SCH. PSYCH. REv. 201, 203 (2000) ("The unique cir-
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and thereby fails to equally provide them with the same advan-
tages and opportunities as non-LGBT students. In compari-
son, under a substantive equality approach, counselors would
receive additional training and provide additional services to
meet the needs of LGBT students, thereby ensuring they re-
ceive the same benefits as their peers.
A formal equality approach to Title IX will similarly fail to
amend Leon's deprivation of the benefits of sexual educational
classes. Undoubtedly, Leon has received the exact same sex-
ual education information and instruction as his non-gay
peers. However, because of Leon's special circumstances (his
sexuality), the restrictions on sex education fail to provide him
with the same advantages as his heterosexual peers; a con-
structive atmosphere to learn about his developing
sexuality.2 85
By contrast, a substantive equality approach can recognize
that Leon is being deprived of a benefit of the educational op-
portunity, and adapt with a curriculum that incorporates infor-
mation that Leon requires as a gay man.
3. Vignette Three-Mark
Mark is a 20-year-old, gay male who has just started
university. During freshman orientation Mark was required
to attend several lectures and workshops on sexual assault,
but none discussed or addressed same-sex sexual as-
sault.2 8 6 Mark's university offers Rape Aggression Defense
(RAD) classes, however when Mark tries to register, he is told
that the classes are only offered to women.2 87
cumstances of sexual minority youth contribute to their risk of substance abuse
and require specialized responses from psychologists and other adults.").
285 This may also be interpreted through the reasoning in Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women, that is, a deprivation of a student's higher goals. In a sense,
though Leon has received equal instruction, he has been deprived benefits that
support his higher goals. Presumably, Leon would like to have healthy adult
relationships. Therefore, failing to provide him with the necessary tools, while
simultaneously providing them to his peers is evidence of the unequal benefits
received.
286 See Michael Scarce, Same-Sex Rape of Male College Students, 45 J. AM. C.
HEALTH 171, 172 (1997) ("Discussions of adult male rape are frequently absent in
campus rape education and prevention programs because the general public and
popular culture have traditionally viewed rape in a context of violence against
women.").
287 See Rape Aggression Defense (R.A.D.) Systems, CAL. STATE U. MONTEREY BAY
[hereinafter CSU R.A.D.] https://csumb.edu/police/rape-aggression-defense-
rad-systems [https://perma.cc/8JAY-B98Z] ("The class is only offered to female
(assigned, transgender, identify-as) CSUMB students, staff and faculty." (empha-
sis added)). This is a common occurrence. Many colleges and universities have
rape defense classes that are either restricted to women or do not address same-
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Later in the semester, Mark decides to attend a fraternity
party. After hours of drinking, Mark is visibly intoxicated
when a fraternity brother invites him upstairs to his room.
There, despite Mark's protests and clearly drunken state, the
fraternity brother initiates sex with him. Because the other
man is stronger than him, and because Mark does not know
how to defend himself, he is unable to get away.
When Mark tries to report the rape he is met with disbe-
lief and ignorance: the on-campus police are insensitive to-
ward Mark's report and suggest that Mark was responsible
for the assault because he was gay; 2 8 8 the university's Title
IX coordinator has no male-specific or gender-neutral victim
literature to offer Mark; 2 8 9 and the university's medical pro-
fessionals have received no training on caring for male survi-
vors of rape. 2 9 0 Mark is left victimized twice over; first by the
assault, and then by the university's inadequacies.
sex sexual assault. Male LGBT students are usually not allowed to attend. See,
e.g., E-mail from Curtis Galbreath, Officer, Franklin & Marshall Coll., to author
(Jan. 22, 2014, 9:47 AM ESTJ) (on file with Cornell Law Review) ("The Department
of Public Safety is conducting Rape Aggression Defense class [sic] . ... This is a
free 12 hour self-defense class for women."); Ithaca Coll. Feminists United et al.,
Commentary: Students Address Rape Aggression Defense Course, ITHACAN (Aug.
26, 2015), https://theithacan.org/opinion/commentary-students-address-rape-
aggression-defense-course/ [https://perma.cc/6WVB-P2HG] ("We take issue
with the program because it is exclusionary . . . . Only offering the course to
women creates a false, heterosexual binary where women are the victims and men
are the perpetrators."); Rape Aggression Defense (RAD) Classes, CORNELL C.,
https://www.comellcollege.edu/campus-safety/programs/RAD.shtml [https://
perrna.cc/2GHK-WF6E] ("The majority of sexual assaults are committed by men
against women. R.A.D. techniques are based on surprise and speed, and we as
instructors cannot run the risk of giving the 'weapons' we are teaching our female
students to a potential attacker."); S.A.F.E. (Self-defense Awareness & Familiari-
zation Exchange), FRANKLiN & MARSHALL C., https://www.fandm.edu/public-
safety/services/s-a-f-e-self-defense-awareness-familiarization-exchange [https:/
/perma.cc/32SA-CYQM] ("The S.A.F.E. program is intended for women only.
While we know anyone can experience harm, including sexual violence, our goal is
to assist women, (the largest population who experience sexual violence) with risk
reduction strategies." (emphasis added)). In some cases, while RAD classes are
openly offered to women, men must specially request classes. See, e.g., RAD Self
Defense Courses, U. PENN. DIv. PuB. SAFETY, https://www.publicsafety.upenn.edu
/safety-initiatives/rad-self-defense-courses/ [https://perma.cc/4259-UBMX]
("RAD classes for men are available by appointment only."). in other cases, insti-
tutions offer "Resisting Aggression with Defense" classes for men in place of Rape
Aggression Defense classes. The latter does not address sexual violence and is
geared toward general self-defense. See, e.g., CSUR.A.D., supra note 287 (specify-
ing that "[tihis program is designed to empower participants to make safer choices
when confronted with aggressive behavior" without mentioning sexual assault
specifically).
288 See Scarce, supra note 286, at 172.
289 JCL
290 Id.
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Mark's experiences demonstrate how LGBT students are
denied the benefits of educational programs within the scope of
sexual assault education, prevention, and care. Sexual assault
orientation programs routinely fail to address same-sex rape
and sexual assault,29 1 and the free rape defense classes offered
on campus are typically restricted to women. 292 Further, in the
aftermath of sexual assault, universities often fail to provide
queer students with services comparable to their cisgender-
heterosexual counterparts. 2 9 3 All these examples indicate
that, as a gay student, Mark has been deprived of equitable
"aid, benefit[s], or servicels]" that other students receive.2 94
LGBT students require specialized post-assault care. 295
For example, post-assault counselors must be especially con-
scious to address unique issues faced by transgender vic-
timS 2 9 6 and to not invalidate or erase the identity of bisexual
students. 29 7 Similarly, male same-sex rape kits must be ad-
ministered differently,298 male victims may prefer not to have
291 See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
292 Admittedly, a formal equality approach to Title IX may work in the example
of Rape Defense Classes-that is, Mark was undoubtedly denied access to an
educational program on account of his sex. Simply removing the sex restrictions
on RAD classes may fix the Title IX violation. That example turns on whether RAD
classes teach techniques that work in a gender-neutral manner, therefore work-
ing irrespective of victim and perpetrator gender.
293 See, e.g., Zoe Ridolfi-Starr, Transformation Requires Transparency: Critical
Policy Reforms to Advance Campus Sexual Violence Response, 125 YALE L.J. 2156
2170-71 (2016) (noting that many queer students "report that their school offi-
cials fail to appropriately respond to reports of sexual violence and harassment
made by LGBTQ students and are more likely to mishandle these complaints or
dismiss them altogether").
294 See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
295 See Scarce, supra note 286, at 172; see also Sara B. Oswalt, Don't Forget
the "B": Considering Bisexual Students and Their Spectfic Health Needs, 57 J. AM.
C. HEALTH 557, 558-59 (2009) (discussing the failure to address the specific
health needs of Bisexual students); Jeffrey L. Todahi et al., Sexual Assault Support
Services and Community Systems: Understanding Critical Issues and Needs in the
LGBTQ Community, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 952, 955 (2009) ("LGBTQ survi-
vors of sexual violence endure unique obstacles related to social attitudes and
system responses."); Victim Centered Care, SExuAL ASSAULT FORENSIC EXAM'RS,
https://www.safeta.org/page/VictimCenteredLGBTQ [https://perma.cc/WL97-
LJHJ] (listing recommendations for LGBT care).
296 See Victim Centered Care, supra note 295 (detailing specific post-assault
treatment strategies for transgender and gender nonconforming victims of sexual
assault).
297 See Oswalt, supra note 295, at 558 (discussing the unique mental health
challenges of persons who identify as bisexual and emphasizing the importance
for campus health services to recognize and validate bisexuality).
298 See Scarce, supra note 286, at 172.
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female nurses,29 9 and gender neutral or male specific literature
is preferred for male victims.3 0 0
In the present vignette, under a formal equality approach,
Mark's specific needs as a gay male victim have not have been
met. Yet, under a substantive equality approach to Title IX,
Mark's specific needs would be considered and provided for;
ensuring that he appropriately receives the specific health ser-
vices he requires, and guaranteeing benefits equivalent to
those received by his non-gay cohort.
In sum, the three vignettes analyzed represented only a few
illustrations of the ways in which LGBT students are victim-
ized, discriminated against, and deprived many of the benefits
of educational programs. It is clear therefore that solutions
utilizing a formal equality approach fail to comprehensively
solve the issues LGBT students face. 30 Instead, by approach-
ing Title IX violations with a view towards honoring the stat-
ute's substantive equality mandate, institutions will ultimately
be better able to serve LGBT students.
IV
A MODEL OF QUEER STUDENT EQUITY
This Part completes this Note's thought experiment by
describing examples where institutions have deprived LGBT
students some benefits of educational opportunities, and sug-
gesting how Title IX may be used to ensure substantive equal-
ity. For each level of education, this Part suggests illustrative
299 Id
300 Id
301 Taking a step back, it seems likely that formal equality arguments will not
help solve the discrimination and issues that the queer community faces as a
whole. Professor Libby Adler has aptly and artfully demonstrated this in an
interrogation of formal equality strategies:
Will all of our legal problems be solved? Will whatever trouble re-
mains be due to our own inherent oddity or moral inferiority? What
will we say when we have formal equality, but our youth are still
disproportionately homeless, in foster care, abusing substances and
suicidal? What will we say when we have formal equality, but HIV or
some as yet unknown sexually transmitted successor ravages some
segment of our community? What will we say when we have formal
equality, but-unable to afford crucial gender-affirming health
care-the impoverished among us are still taking street quality hor-
mones, injecting silicone, and subjecting themselves to arrest-in-
cluding police and prison violence-after engaging in sex work and
other criminal activity to survive and to pay for health-related
needs? What will we say when we have formal equality, but some-
how, subtly, and always with some accompanying rationale, we find
ourselves more vulnerable than others to allegations of obscenity,
sexual impropriety, or predation?
Adler, Gay Rights and Lefts, supra note 29, at 9.
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examples of services or alterations that can be made to ensure
that LGBT students are receiving the same, or substantially
similar, benefits as non-LGBT students.
A. The Model
1. Elementary/Primary Level
One of the key benefits offered by early childhood educa-
tional institutions is support in the development of identity and
a healthy psychological view of self.302 Particularly in the first
years of early childhood education, teachers play a crucial role
in identity development. 3 0 3 In this context, LGBT-specific ser-
vices and amenities may include the following:
a. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Affirming
Instruction & Curricula
As demonstrated in the first vignette,3 0 4 teacher queer-
phobia can have lifelong impacts on how queer students view
themselves.3 0 5 The reasoning in Brown is instructive: how a
teacher addresses young children's gender expression may ul-
timately impose "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."30 6
Because identity development is the key benefit offered at
the elementary education level, Title IX requires more than
simply remaining neutral on LGBT identity and topics. 3 0 7 To
ensure that LGBT students are developing a sense of self-worth
equal to their peers, institutions must actively affirm LGBT life
302 Orly Rachmilovitz, No Queer Child Left Behind, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 203, 210
(2017).
303 Id. at 217 ("Nowhere is the denial of exploration in identity development
more critical than to children in a developmental stage that centers around this
task.").
304 See supra section III.D. 1.
305 See supra section III.D.2.
306 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
307 Tracy Burt et al., Do No Harn Creating Welcoming and Inclusive Environ-
ments for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Families in Early Child-
hood Settings, YC YOUNG CHILDREN, Jan. 2010, at 97, 98 ("All too often, without
even realizing it, educators harm children and families through personal assump-
tions or biases and institutionalized silence. When children never hear words nor
see images that reflect their families or themselves in positive ways, they are being
harmed."); Michelle L. Page, Teaching in the Cracks: Using Familiar Pedagogy to
Advance LGBTQ-Inclusive Curriculum, 60 J. ADOLESCENT & ADULT LITERACY 677,
678 (2017) ("One of the greatest traumas that gender- and sexual-minority stu-
dents experience is not bullying but invisibility and silence.... It creates 'stigma-
tizing messages' that these students are not valued. Students' identities are
erased and invalidated.").
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and lifestyles in class instruction and in the resources they
provide.3 0 8 Research on the impact of curriculum representa-
tion on students of color finds "greater academic performance,
education aspirations, and academic self-confidence," 309 where
efforts to promote representation are implemented. The same
is likely true for queer students. 3 10
Failing to feature positive, or any, imagery of LGBT life can
severely affect how LGBT students view themselves, and that
failure deprives them of the most essential benefit provided by
the elementary education stage.3 11 As lesbian essayist Ad-
rienne Rich has aptly phrased: "[When someone with the au-
thority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in
it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked
into a mirror and saw nothing."312
The need for LGBT-identity-affirming instruction and re-
sources is particularly vital in light of the consideration that
young queer persons are unlikely to have other LGBT role mod-
els or family members.3 13 Orly Rachmilovitz has pointed out:
"As opposed to racial or religious minority youth whose com-
munity may typically share their racial or religious identity and
can therefore provide guidance, support, and encouragement
during the stages of identity development, LGBT youth usually
have no such inherent support system."3 14
Given LGBT children's unique needs for representatives,
specific examples of resources include books, pictures, photos,
puzzles, and movies that feature positive LGBT protagonists;
featuring an examination of LGBT families during conversa-
308 See Sarah Warbelow, LGBT Youth Legal Landscape, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L.
REv. 413, 426-27 (2014) ("The ability of students to see themselves positively
represented in curriculum has an influence on both psychological well-being and
academic success.").
309 Id. at 427.
310 Id ("Though not fully researched, presumably the effects of positive curric-
ula on LGBT youth would mirror the effects on other minority populations.").
311 Cf. LEE KLINGER LESSER ET AL., MAKING ROOM IN THE CIRCLE: LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILIES IN EARLY CHILDHOOD SE1TINGS 112 (2005)
("[Teachers] should have stopped homophobic remarks and used them as a
springboard to discuss fairness, equality, and the contributions made by gay
people so that I could be proud of myself. I should have grown up with their
support and love because it was their ethical responsibility to me, a five-year-old
gay boy in their care.").
312 ADRIENNE RICH, Invisibility in Academe, in BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SE-
LECTED PROSE 1979-1985, at 198, 199 (1994).
313 Jason D.P. Bird et al., The Impact of Role Models on Health Outcomes for
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 50 J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 353,
353 (2012).
314 Rachmilovitz, supra note 302, at 220.
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tions on family types;3 15 and using gender-affirming language
for children who have indicated an alternative gender iden-
tity.3 1 6 More importantly, institutions must train teachers on
how to address LGBT topics in order to provide an inclusive,
welcoming, and affirming environment in order to aid a young
LGBT student's identity formation; recent studies suggest
teachers are woefully undertrained to address these issues.3 17
2. Secondary Level
During the secondary level of education, educational insti-
tutions provide important benefits in terms of the development
of healthy social and emotional skills, as well as lay the founda-
tion of good adult citizenship.3 18 During high school, most
teenagers develop crucial competencies they need for their
transition into adulthood.3 19 Additionally, the high school pe-
riod is typically when queer youth become aware of their sexual
and gender identity.3 20 Unfortunately, high school is often fil-
led with discrimination, bullying, and exclusion for LGBT
youth.32 1 In this context, LGBT-specific services and amenities
could include the following:
315 See, e.g., Michael Alison Chandler, In D.C. Schools, Gay-Tolerance Lessons
Are Becoming Elementary, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2012), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/local/education/in-dc-schools-gay-tolerance-lessons-are-be-
coming-elementary/2012/01/29/gIQA8YLFqQ-story.html [https://perma.cc/
Y6U4-UTNX] (discussing the integration of LGBT identity in pre-kindergarten
classes).
316 See Rebecca Prinster, Words Matter: Affirming Gender Identity Through
Language, INSIGHT INTO DIVERSITY (May 16, 2016), http://www.insightintodivers-
ity.com/words-matter-affirming-gender-identity-through-language/ [https://
perma.cc/8G36-GNNS] (using preferred language "affirms" gender identity).
317 Megan Beren, Gay and Lesbian Families in the Early Childhood Classroom
Evaluation of an Online Professional Development Course, LEARNING LANDSCAPES,
Autumn 2013, at 61, 76 (finding that LGBT topics are rarely discussed in teacher
education programs).
318 See Kell Kristine Armstrong, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focus-
ing on the Needs of Gay Youth in Our Public Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 67,
71 (1994).
319 Id.
320 Joyce Hunter & Robert Schaecher, Stresses on Lesbian and Gay Adoles-
cents in School, 9 Soc. WORK EDUC. 180, 180 (1987) ("An awareness of a homosex-
ual orientation often emerges in students during their high school years. A
significant portion of these self-identified youngsters experience unique stresses
that the school system needs to recognize and address in an affirmative
manner.").
321 See Gerald Unks, Thinking About the Gay Teen, in THE GAY TEEN: EDUCA-
TIONAL PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS 3, 5 (Ger-
ald Unks ed., 1995) ("While forces in the larger adult society might hint at political
correctness, acceptance, and accommodation, the high school-the center of
most adolescent life and culture-stands staunchly aloof and rigidly resistant to
even a suggestion that any of its faculty or student body might be homosexual or
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a. LGBT-Issue Trained Counselors
Many schools provide counselors to help high school stu-
dents navigate adolescence. 3 22 Unfortunately, often such
counselors are ill-equipped and unprepared to sufficiently pro-
vide support for queer youth. 32 3 This is especially concerning
in light of statistics indicating that LGBT youth face signifi-
cantly higher rates of bullying,3 24 which leads to lower grades,
increased absences, higher levels of depression, and lower
levels of self-esteem. 325
To address issues specific to the challenges queer youth
face, schools should begin training counselors to address the
needs of LGBT students. Specific training could include a fa-
miliarity with LGBT-inclusive educational resources, discretion
with student's sexual and gender identities, and even training
on how to best help LGBT students select and apply to tertiary
institutions where they will be most comfortable. 326
b. LGBT-Specific Sexual Education
As discussed in the second vignette, 327 high school sexual-
education classes may often fail to instruct students on topics
that are useful for LGBT youth.328 This is undoubtedly the
that homosexuals deserve anything but derision and scorn within its walls. High
schools may be the most homophobic institutions in American society . . . .").
322 AM. SCH. COUNSELOR ASS'N, THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF HIGH SCHOOL COUNSELORS
1 (2017), https://www.schoolcounselor.org/asca/media/asca/Careers-Roles/
WhyHighSchool.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6T4-S7LQ].
323 See Ryan M. Kull et al., Preparing School Counselors to Support LGBT
Youth The Roles of Graduate Education and Professional Development, PROF. SCH.
COUNSELING, Jan. 2017, at 13, 14 ("[Elducators in general have been found to
intervene only infrequently in the victimization of LGBT students ... .1.
324 JOSEPH G. KOSCIW 1T AL., GLSEN, THE 2013 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SUR-
VEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BIsEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR
NATION'S SCHOOLS 21 (2014), https: //www.gsen.org/sites/default/files/
2013%2oNational%2OSchool%20Climate%2OSurvey/o2OFull%2OReportO.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L9YP-SE6Z].
325 icL
326 See generally Jeffrey D. Cook, Searching for Gay-Friendly Colleges: How
Guidance Counselors Can Help Their Gay Students, J.C. ADMISSION, Summer
2001, at 9 (discussing the importance of guidance counselors in a gay youth's
college search and application process).
327 See supra section III.D.2.
328 According to one study, "only 3.8% [of students] reported their health
curricula acknowledging sexual and/or gender orientation." L. Kris Gowen &
Nichole Winges-Yanez, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Question-
ing Youths' Perspectives of Inclusive School-Based Sexuality Education, 51 J. SEX
RES. 788, 788 (2014); see also John P. Elia & Mickey Eliason, Discourses of
Exclusion: Sexuality Education's Silencing of Sexual Others, 7 J. LGBT YOUTH 29,
45 (2010) (-The ways in which the majority of sexuality education programs/
classes/offerings have been carried out both nationally and internationally mostly
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deprivation of an educational benefit, because "[hiuman sexu-
ality, unlike calculus, is something you will actually need to
know for the rest of your life." 3 2 9 As we have seen, where sex-
ual education classes do include discussions of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity, it is often in tandem with
conversations on HIV and AIDS; bolstering the stereotype that
"only gay people get [AIDS]."3 3 0
In other instances, no-promo-homo laws actively deprive
LGBT students of information on safe sexual practices, or stig-
matize queer students.3 3 1 These no-promo-homo laws may re-
strict teachers from discussing homosexuality, 3 3 2 prohibit
teachers from portraying homosexuality positively,3 33 or re-
quire teachers to portray homosexuality as "an unacceptable
lifestyle, a criminal offense, or a cause of sexually transmitted
infections."3 3 4 Unquestionably, this is degrading to students
who are queer.33 5
By suggesting that LGBT persons are inherently criminal,
these laws impose feelings of inferiority upon queer youth dur-
ing a crucial stage of the development of their sexual identi-
ties.3 3 6 Further, these classes fail to effectively provide LGBT
youth with information on safe sexual practices relevant to
their potential experiences.3 3 7 Statistics indicate that LGBT
defaults to the heteronormative mode. . . . The most common discourses sur-
rounding sexuality education have pushed LGBTQ issues into the margins or
have systematically erased them altogether . . . .").
329 Tiffany Pham, Stepping out of the Closet: Creating More Inclusive Sexual
Education Instruction for Texas Public Schools, 17 TEx. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 347, 347
(2016) (citing Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Sex Ed (HBO Aug. 9, 2015)).
330 Gowen & Winges-Yanez, supra note 328, at 792.
331 See generally Rosky, supra note 272 (discussing the prevalence and effects
of "no promo homo" laws).
332 Id. at 1469 ("In South Carolina, health education programs 'may not in-
clude a discussion of alternate sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships
including, but not limited to, homosexual relationships except in the context of
instruction concerning sexually transmitted diseases.'").
333 Id. at 1470 ("Arizona law prohibits teachers from offering any 'instruction
which . . . [promotes a homosexual life-style,' '[p]ortrays homosexuality as a
positive alternative life-style,' or '[sluggests that some methods of sex are safe
methods of homosexual sex.'" (alterations in original)).
334 Id. at 1470-71 (noting that both Texas and Alabama require teachers to
inform students that homosexual intimacy is criminalized under state law).
335 Id. at 1520.
336 Id. at 1519-22.
337 See A Call to Action LGB7 Youth Need Inclusive Sex Education, HUM. Rrs.
CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/a-call-to-action-gbtq-youth-need-in-
clusive-sex-education [https://perma.cc/9SPN-Y8SM] ("LGBTQ-inclusive sex ed-
ucation is not available for most youth. The GLSEN 2013 National School Climate
Survey found that fewer than five percent of LGBT students had health classes
that included positive representations of LGBT-related topics.").
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students at schools that do not have LGBT-inclusive sexual
education classes face higher risk of HIV infection, bullying,
and suicide.3 38 What is more, the exclusion of LGBT-specific
sexual education is damaging to the queer student's psyche.3 3 9
In order to ensure that LGBT students are not deprived of
information and the experience that their heterosexual and
cisgender cohorts receive, a substantive equality approach to
Title IX would require schools to expand their sexual-education
curriculums to include coverage of topics relevant to the sexual
health of LGBT youth. Such an approach would require sexual
education classes to refrain from expressing prejudices
against, or fueling misinformation about, LGBT intimacy,
which will ensure that queer youth receive the benefit of in-
struction that will help them navigate adult sexual
relationships.
c. LGBT Affirming Social Atmosphere
As addressed in the second vignette,34 0 a queer student's
Title IX rights are violated where they have been prohibited
from attending social events based on their sexual orientation,
gender identity, or gender expression. 3 41 In recent years, LGBT
students have routinely been prohibited from attending, or
physically excluded from, social events because of their apparel
or choice of date.3 4 2 These social events constitute "benefits,"
338 See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
339 Scott N. Ihrig, Sexual Orientation in Law School: Experiences of Gay, Les-
bian, and Bisexual Law Students, 14 IAW & INEQ. 555, 570 (1996) ("[Eixclusion
itself matters. Forced invisibility can be more damaging than outright hostility.
With hostility, your existence is acknowledged . .. . Invisibility and exclusion,
though, are elusive; they are difficult to define and grasp. It hides us from history
and allows others to deny our existence, to reject our claims to basic civil rights,
and to define us as evil-child-molesting-family-wrecking sinners.").
340 See supra section III.D.2.
341 See, e.g., Castillo Letter, supra note 276 (demonstrating that excluding
LGBT students from social events because of their sexual orientation or gender
identity violates Title IX); SPLC Helps LGBT Student Assert Her Right to Wear Prom
Tuxedo, SOUTHERN PovERTY L. CTR. (May 16, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/
news/2018/05/16/splc-helps-lgbt-student-assert-her-right-wear-prom-tuxedo
[https://perma.cc/M762-PZFF] (describing a Title IX argument in a case where a
lesbian was barred from prom for wearing gender nonconforming clothing); see
also, e.g., Logan v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-431-JVB, 2008 WL
4411518, at *4 (finding a genuine Title IX issue in a case where "Plaintiff and
Defendants disagree on the reason Logan was excluded from the prom. Plaintiff
indicates that it was because of his sex, while Defendants claim it was because of
his dress.").
342 See, e.g., Kate Briquelet, School Banned Gay Prom Dates: Lawsuit, DAILY
BEAsT (May 12, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/school-banned-
gay-prom-dates-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/PZ42-KDPW] (detailing a Buffalo high
school's restrictions against same-sex prom dates); AnnaLise Coble, No Prom for
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for the purposes of Title IX, particularly because of the impor-
tance of social-skill development during adolescence. Viewed
thus, in order to ensure that queer students are not deprived of
these opportunities, a substantive equality approach to Title IX
would require that schools do not restrict a student's choice of
apparel or date based on queerphobic biases.
3. Higher Education
For many LGBT students, college is the first time they ex-
perience life away from home and can explore relationships,
intimacy, sexuality, and personhood outside the confines of
parental supervision. It may also be the first time that queer
students have a chance to freely express their sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity and have access to the related medical
and healthcare services. Within this context, LGBT specific
services and amenities could include the following:
John Tyler High School Senior, EASr TEX. MATTERS (Apr. 30, 2018, 8:50 PM), https:/
/www.easttexasmatters.com/news/local-news/no-prom-for-john-tyler-high-
school-senior/ 1152137049 [https://perma.cc/8X79-CRAR] (detailing a school's
exclusion of a lesbian student's girlfriend from prom); Valerie Edwards, Gay
Couple Banned from School Prom by Assistant Principal Who then Suspends Them
when They Complain to Their Mothers, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 6, 2016, 9:59 PM), https:/
/www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3479807/Gay-couple-banned-school-prom-
assistant-principal-suspends-complain-mothers.html [https://perma.cc/7NFJ-
4QG4] (detailing a gay couple excluded from prom because "same sex couples
going to prom 'were against school regulations'"); Rex W. Huppke, Senior Girl
Pushes Back, Allowed to Get Dressed up, in Tux, for Prom, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 31,
2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2011-03-31-ct-met-prom-
tux-20110331-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q2VM-TABU] (detailing a school's
attempt to exclude a lesbian student from prom for wearing a tuxedo); Barry
Leibowitz, Constance McMillen, Focus of "Lesbian Prom" Fight, Wins Discrimination
Settlement, CBS NEws (July 21, 2010, 4:53 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/constance-mcmllen-focus-of-lesbian-prom-fight-wins-discrimination-set-
tlement/ [https://perma.cc/8NXX-SBFJI (detailing a Mississippi High School
student's lawsuit against her high school that canceled its prom rather than allow
her to attend with a female date); Yanan Wang, Pennsylvania Girl Says She Was
Thrown Out of Her Prom for Wearing a Suit, WASH. PosT (May 9, 2016). https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/09/pennsylvania-
girl-says-she-was-thrown-out-of-her-prom-for-wearing-a-suit/ [https://
perma.cc/S64A-MWE3]; Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Reaches
Settlement Agreement with Indiana School District After Transgender Student
Was Barred from Prom (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www.lambdalegal.org/news/
in_20110128_reaches-agreement [https://perma.cc/4XFB-7LGJ] (detailing a set-
tlement in a lawsuit by a transgender student barred from prom). Indeed, the
2015 GLSEN Study found that 26.5% of LGBT students' schools had prevented
same-sex couples from attending school dances and 15.6% had been personally
barred from attending dances with a same-sex date. See KoscIW ET AL., supra note
268, at 36.
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a. LGBT-Inclusive Sexual Assault Education, Prevention
Programs & Treatment
The third vignette demonstrated the importance of inte-
grating LGBT topics into an institution's sexual assault educa-
tion and prevention programs34 3 Presently, the majority of
orientation programs fail to discuss same-sex sexual assault-
putting queer students at a disadvantage. Moreover, rape
aggression defense classes may be restricted based on gender,
again depriving queerfolk of the opportunity to learn crucial
defense skills. Indeed, as of March 2017, no on-campus pro-
grams aimed at preventing sexual assault have been tested
amongst LGBT college students.3 4 5
The inadequacies of sexual assault programs are particu-
larly jarring in light of recent statistics indicating higher rates
of sexual assault against LGBT college students in comparison
to their heterosexual and cisgender colleagues.? 6 To ensure
that LGBT students are not deprived of advantages or services
that other heterosexual and cisgender students receive, a sub-
stantive equality approach to Title IX requires colleges integrate
LGBT related topics into their sexual assault programming.
Specific programs might include sexual violence and self-de-
fense classes that are geared towards the needs of all genders,
and LGBT students in particular.3 47
343 See supra section III.D.3.
344 Erin Schumaker, How Some Colleges Put LGBT Students at Greater Risk of
Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2017, 5:12 PM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lgbt-students-sexual-assault-us_58d2abb7e4b
02d33b747b4a4 [https://perma.cc/J9R6-B7HJI ("Current college sexual assault
prevention programs typically don't include LGBT intervention strategies or
concerns . . . .").
345 Andrew M. Seaman, Campus Environment Tied to Sexual Assault Risk for
LGBT People, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2017, 6:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-health-lgbt-college-assault/campus-environment-tied-to-sexual-assault-
risk-for-lgbt-people-idUSKBN170351? [http://perma.cc/8PRA-6CMS].
346 ASS'N OF AM. UNIVS., CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL
MIScONDUCT 34-35 (2015) (reporting that 60.4% of lesbian and gay students report
having been sexually assaulted on campus in comparison to 45.8% of their heter-
osexual counterparts); see also Casey Quinlan, The Campus Sexual Assault Epi-
demic Is Even Worse for LGBTQ Students, ESTABUSHMENT (Apr. 26, 2016), https://
theestablishment.co/the-campus-sexual-assault-epidemic-is-even-worse-for-
lgbtq-students-98caa6afc9dd [http://perma.cc/HVL2-CXLB].
347 E.g., Cal Self Defense for All, UC BERKELEY, https://campuscli-
mate.berkeley.edu/students/centers-educational-justice-community-engage-
ment/gender-equity-resource-center/geneq [https://perma.cc/4HM4-JTKW];
see also, e.g., LGBTQ Self-Defense, CTR. FOR ANTI-VIOLENCE EDUC., https://
caeny.org/programs/adults/lgbtq/ [https://perma.cc/HN9J-YQUM].
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An LGBT-focused sexual-assault-prevention training of-
fered at the University of California, Berkeley,34 8 for example,
teaches students general self-defense techniques, in addition
to techniques for safely navigating relationships, intra-relation-
ship violence, and online dating. These topics are likely of vital
importance to LGBT students on campus: First, research finds
that, on the whole, queerfolk experience heightened rates of
intra-relationship violence compared to their non-queer coun-
terparts,3 4 9 and that rates of intimate partner violence are es-
pecially high for transgender women3 50 and LGBT college
students.3 5 ' Equally, discussions of self-defense within queer
relationships may be a critical tool for LGBT students, given
the law's failure to address the unique challenges that violence
presents within LGBT relationships. 3 5 2 Secondly, maintaining
safety while online dating is of particular interest to LGBT stu-
dents given the popularity of online dating apps within the
queer community, as well as the recent spate of high-profile
348 E-mail from Micaela Camozzi, Gender Equity Resource Ctr., Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley, to Author (on file with Cornell Law Review); Univ. of Cal., Berkeley,
Queer and Transgender Self Defense Class Course Outline (on file with Cornell
Law Review).
349 See TAYLOR N.T. BROWN & JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS INST., INTIMATE PARINER
VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ABUSE AMONG LGBT PEOPLE 2 (2015), https://williamsinsti-
tute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Intimate-Partner-Violence-and-Sexual-
Abuse-among-LGBT-People. pdf [https://perma.cc/D4ER-XXMN] (collecting
studies of intimate partner violence in LGBT relationships).
350 Id.; see also John Paul Brammer, Brutal Murder Highlights Intimate Partner
Violence in Transgender Community, NBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2018, 11:06 AM),
https: / /www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/recent-murder-highlights-inti-
mate-partner-violence-trans-community-n837161 [https://perma.cc/5N7M-
EMV3] (detailing the unique challenges facing transgender victims of intimate
partner violence).
351 Katie Edwards & Kateryna Sylaska, Intimate Partner Violence Among
LGBTQ+ College Students, CARSEY INST., Spring 2014, at 1, 1 (reporting that four in
ten LGBTQ+ college students have faced intimate partner violence within a cur-
rent relationship); Adrienne Green & Alia Wong, LGBT Students and Campus
Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/educa-
tion/archive/2015/09/campus-sexual-assault-1gbt-students/406684/ [https://
perma.cc/6C5D-63HW] (noting that lesbian and gay college youth experienced
intimate partner violence at a rate of 12.8% compared to bisexual students' 18.5%
and heterosexual students' 9%).
352 See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse,
and the Legal System, 48 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 51, 51 (2013) (detailing the
challenges of crafting legal solutions to intimate partner violence faced by trans-
gender persons); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law
and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567, 571-81 (1990) (detail-
ing the law's failure to adequately address violence in lesbian relationships);
Sharon Stapel, Falling to Pieces: New York State Civil Legal Remedies Available to
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Survivors of Domestic Violence, 52 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REv. 248, 249-50 (2007) (detailing the inadequacies of New York law in
addressing LGBT domestic violence).
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episodes of violence against sexual-minority victims lured
through online dating websites and apps.3 5 3
Also demonstrated, is the fact that post-sexual assault
treatment typically fails to provide queer students with benefits
equal to those received by their cisgender-heterosexual coun-
terparts. To that end, a substantive equality approach to Title
IX might require post-sexual-assault treatment and counseling
that is useful to LGBT victims of sexual violence. Specific re-
sources might include gender-neutral and male-specific litera-
ture, intake forms with LGBT-inclusive options (i.e.,
transgender and intersex gender options), and post-assault
counseling for unique issues faced by LGBT victims. 3 5 4 For
male victims of same-sex violence, HIV transmission and infec-
tions present additional concems.35 5 Such victims deserve ac-
cess to the substantive benefit of post-sexual-assault medical
treatment that is adapted to their specific circumstances.
Given the probability of high-risk exposure, specific post-sex-
ual-assault treatment for queer men may include post-expo-
sure prophylaxis (PEP) to reduce the possibilities of HIV
transmission.356
353 See, e.g., Chuck Johnston, Texas Men Accused of Luring Gay Victims via
Dating App, CNN (May 10, 2017, 10:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/
10/us/gay-dating-app-assaults-grindr/index.html [https://perma.cc/VW4C-
J533); Mary Emily O'Hara, Lured Over Dating Apps, LGBT Men Are Targets of
Violence and Crime, DAILY DOT (Jan. 29, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://
www.dailydot.com/irl/hate-crime-attacks-gay-dating-apps/ [https://perma.cc/
2LQD-2A3T]; Trudy Ring, Men Lured to Oklahoma City Home via Grindr, then
Robbed at Gunpoint, ADVOCATE (Sept. 20, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://
www.advocate.com/crime/2018/9/20/men-lured-oklahoma-city-home-grindr-
then-robbed-gunpoint [https://perma.cc/7T9-J62G].
354 Victim Centered Care, supra note 295.
355 BRrT HERSTAD, USAID, GENDER-RELATED BARRIERS TO HIV PREVENTION METH-
ODS: A REVIEW OF POsT-ExPOsURE PROPHYLAXIS (PEP) POLICIES FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT 1,
9 (2009) (noting male victims of same-sex sexual violence "have a higher risk of
acquiring HIV from an assault").
356 See C Fong, Post-Exposure Prophylaxis for HIV Infection After Sexual As-
sault: When Is It Indicated?, 18 EMERGENCY MED. J. 242, 242-43 (2001) (sug-
gesting a higher risk of HIV transmission in the context of male same-sex sexual
assault); see also Jessica E. Draughon, Sexual Assault Injuries and Increased
Risk of HIV Transmission, 34 ADVANCED EMERGENCY NURSING J. 82, 83 (2012)
(same); Meredith Scannell et al., A Meta-Analysis ofHIV Postexposure Prophylaxis
Among Sexually Assaulted Patients in the United States, 29 J. ASS'N NURSES AIDS
CARE 60, 61 (2018) (demonstrating that Post-Exposure Prophylaxis is "interna-
tionally recognized and recommended as a key strategy in preventing HIV in
[sexual assault] patients, and should be universally provided to all SA patients"
(citation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrated the inadequacies of applying for-
mal equality solutions to the discrimination that LGBT stu-
dents face. It took a methodical approach to illustrating how
queer students are better served when lawyers, educators, ad-
ministrators, and activists honor the substantive equality
mandate at the heart of Title IX. In the preceding sections, the
Note established that Title IX covers LGBT students, defined
the benefits of educational opportunities, and illustrated in-
stances when queer students have been deprived of them. Ulti-
mately, this Note concluded with example services and
alterations that would ensure that LGBT students received
equal educational benefits guaranteed to them under Title IX.
While this Note proposed and discussed a few ways in which a
substantive equality approach to Title IX could better serve
LGBT students, they are certainly not the only ones.
Title IX can prove to be a transformative tool for bettering
the position of LGBT students throughout the education sys-
tem. Amongst courts and scholars, the consensus has been
that Title IX was designed with substantive equality underpin-
nings; this provides the potential for the statute to be used to
ensure equality of outcomes, rather than the neutral applica-
tion of rules. It is also clear that simply ensuring LGBT stu-
dents have access to existing facets of educational programs is
insufficient to ensure that they receive the true and full bene-
fits of educational opportunities. These conclusions, coupled
with increasing willingness amongst courts to use Title IX
against sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination,
provide fertile ground from which queer equity can spring. It is
now important to ensure that, when using Title IX to combat
discrimination against LGBT students, we honor the substan-
tive equality mandate at its heart and give the statute a "sweep
as broad as its language,"35 7 thereby making certain that no
queer child gets left behind.3 58
357 N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
358 The final line is adapted from the title of Rachmilovitz's article. See
Rachmilovitz, supra note 302.
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APPENDIX
A. Result List for LexisNexis Case search: "educational
opportunity"
Narrowed by: Court: Supreme Court
1. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965)
2. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969)
3. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
4. Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 404 U.S.
1219 (1971)
5. Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972)
6. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973)
7. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973)
8. Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974)
9. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
10. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
11. Regents of Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
12. Estes v. Metro. Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S.
437 (1980)
13. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646 (1980)
14. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
15. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex reL Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982)
16. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982)
17. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457
(1982)
18. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
19. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
20. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582
(1983)
21. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)
22. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research
Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984)
23. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)
24. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986)
25. Kadrmas v. Dickenson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450
(1988)
26. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)
27. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)
28. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
29. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)
30. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
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31. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996)
32. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
33. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998)
34. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629
(1999)
35. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
36. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
37. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009)
38. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009)
39. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009)
40. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988 (2017)
41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
